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Glorious	  Revolution	  as	  Financial	  Revolution	  
John	  Angle	  
Angle	  2	  In	  the	  late	  seventeenth	  century,	  England	  experienced	  a	  dramatic	  political	  and	  religious	  crisis	  that	  fundamentally	  reshaped	  the	  nation’s	  future.	  	  In	  late	  1688,	  a	  group	  of	  English	  elites	  invited	  William	  the	  Stadholder	  of	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Mary	  Stuart,	  the	  daughter	  of	  King	  James	  II,	  to	  invade	  England.	  	  They	  did	  so	  and	  deposed	  the	  king	  in	  a	  relatively	  bloodless	  revolution	  that	  dramatically	  recast	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  religious	  future.	  	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  invasion	  of	  England	  and	  accession	  to	  the	  throne	  has	  traditionally	  been	  called	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution.	  One	  crucial	  key	  to	  the	  invitation	  was	  a	  group	  of	  influential	  London	  merchants	  who	  were	  envious	  of	  the	  Dutch	  economic	  success	  and	  displeased	  with	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  James	  II.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  invited	  William	  to	  invade	  and	  supported	  his	  invasion	  in	  hopes	  of	  bringing	  his	  economic	  policies	  to	  Britain.	  Their	  advocacy	  and	  support	  ultimately	  led	  them	  to	  be	  called	  the	  “Immortal	  Seven.”	  	  At	  mid-­‐century,	  England	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  had	  adopted	  radically	  different	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  policies.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  English	  experienced	  only	  middling	  economic	  growth	  especially	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  Dutch.	  	  Merchants	  considered	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Stuart	  kings	  as	  disadvantageous	  to	  merchants,	  but	  saw	  Dutch	  taxation,	  monetary,	  and	  banking	  practices	  as	  fostering	  trade.	  Historians	  have	  conventionally	  appreciated	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  as	  motivated	  by	  religion	  and	  failed	  to	  fully	  acknowledge	  the	  economic	  motivations	  behind	  their	  support	  for	  William	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  reigning	  monarch	  James	  II.	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  significant	  exceptions.	  P.	  G.	  M.	  Dixon’s	  pathbreaking	  study,	  The	  Financial	  Revolution	  in	  Great	  Britain,	  makes	  him	  the	  forefather	  of	  all	  subsequent	  research	  on	  the	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  that	  emerged	  from	  this	  period,	  and	  coined	  the	  term	  “Financial	  Revolution,”	  but	  his	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  work	  pays	  very	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  revolution	  or	  its	  politics.	  	  In	  War	  and	  Economy,	  D.	  W.	  Jones	  presents	  a	  compelling	  economic	  argument	  by	  paying	  close	  attention	  to	  a	  group	  called	  the	  “New	  London	  Merchants.”	  Steven	  Pincus,	  focuses	  on	  the	  “New	  London	  Merchants,”	  as	  this	  paper	  does,	  as	  important	  to	  causing	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution.	  This	  paper	  builds	  on	  these	  works.	  	  It	  shares	  with	  the	  many	  economic	  studies	  an	  emphasis	  on	  financial	  and	  monetary	  changes	  as	  fundamental	  to	  political	  events	  of	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution.1	  	  This	  paper,	  however,	  aims	  to	  study	  events	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  financial	  dimensions	  of	  both	  causes	  and	  effect.	  It	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  the	  economic	  motivations	  of	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  and	  pays	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  exact	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  changes	  that	  occurred	  in	  Britain	  during	  the	  Financial	  Revolution	  of	  the	  late	  1690s.	  	  	  First,	  I	  discuss	  in	  this	  paper	  the	  attractions	  of	  the	  Dutch	  economic	  model	  for	  seventeenth	  century	  Englishmen	  specifically	  for	  members	  of	  the	  wealthy	  merchant	  class	  that	  likely	  led	  them	  to	  look	  to	  William.	  	  Then	  I	  look	  to	  the	  policies	  William	  favored	  once	  he	  was	  in	  power	  –	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  national	  debt,	  and	  the	  resolution	  of	  chronic	  monetary	  shortages,	  known	  as	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  –-­‐	  and	  suggest	  that	  those	  merchants	  who	  invited	  William	  got	  the	  economic	  benefits	  they	  hoped	  to	  attain	  by	  initiating	  this	  seventeenth-­‐century	  “regime	  change."	  	  William’s	  economic	  and	  monetary	  reforms,	  brought	  to	  England	  by	  the	  Immortal	  Seven,	  taken	  together	  constitute	  a	  Financial	  Revolution.	  	  	  Second,	  this	  paper	  analyzes	  the	  developments	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Financial	  Revolution	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  and	  the	  processes	  that	  allowed	  the	  revolution	  to	  occur.	  	  It	  will	  pay	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  Currency	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  Crisis	  in	  this	  revolution.	  	  Third,	  it	  will	  also	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  revolution	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  financial	  class	  in	  Britain.	  	  Finally,	  it	  will	  look	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  reforms	  promoted	  Britain’s	  later	  commercial	  dominance.	  	  Ultimately	  this	  paper	  places	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  into	  is	  proper	  economic	  context	  by	  explaining	  the	  economic	  conditions	  that	  brought	  it	  about	  and	  the	  economic	  conditions	  that	  it	  produced.	  	  	  
Part	  I.A.	  :	  Mid-­Seventeenth	  Century	  British	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Policies	  In	  the	  mid-­‐seventeenth	  century,	  the	  economy	  of	  Britain	  lagged	  significantly	  behind	  that	  of	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  Its	  banking	  sector	  was	  primitive	  by	  comparison,	  its	  taxation	  archaic,	  and	  its	  fiscal-­‐monetary	  policy	  holding	  back	  the	  nation’s	  development.	  	  The	  problems	  plaguing	  Britain’s	  economy	  became	  especially	  evident	  in	  comparison	  to	  those	  pursued	  by	  Dutch	  leaders.	  	  
At	  that	  time,	  Britain’s	  economy	  was	  primarily	  agrarian,	  and	  its	  largest	  export	  was	  woolen	  textiles	  to	  continental	  Europe.	  2	  	  The	  Crown	  taxed	  the	  little	  industry	  they	  did	  have	  heavily	  and	  did	  very	  little	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  their	  interests.	  	  It	  promoted	  the	  large	  crown	  companies,	  like	  the	  Levant	  and	  East	  India	  Companies,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  small	  merchants.3	  	  Thus,	  the	  English	  economy	  was	  slow	  growing.	  	  Governmental	  policies	  also	  favored	  government	  monopolies	  over	  small	  merchants,	  such	  as	  those	  run	  by	  the	  upstart	  New	  London	  Merchants.	  Despite	  these	  other	  impediments	  to	  economic	  development,	  the	  most	  significant	  issues	  were	  the	  shortage	  of	  hard	  currency	  and	  feeble	  banking	  sector,	  which	  slowed	  development	  and	  expansion	  of	  trade.	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  Britain’s	  financial	  sector	  developed	  later	  and	  more	  slowly	  than	  many	  other	  parts	  of	  Europe,	  slowing	  their	  development.	  	  Wealthy	  families	  like	  the	  Medicis	  had	  historically	  carried	  out	  banking,	  however	  successive	  governments	  bankrupted	  these	  finance	  houses	  when	  they	  defaulted	  on	  their	  debts.	  	  Some,	  such	  as	  the	  Fuggers	  eventually	  went	  on	  to	  build	  successful	  private	  banking	  houses.	  	  Britain’s	  lack	  of	  a	  strong	  banking	  sector	  prevented	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  more	  modern	  economy	  and	  stymied	  growth	  in	  the	  nation.	  	  The	  little	  financial	  sector	  in	  Britain	  that	  existed	  then	  was	  centered	  in	  the	  small	  one	  square-­‐mile	  historical	  center,	  called	  The	  City	  of	  London.	  	  As	  is	  common	  in	  Britain,	  this	  paper	  will	  refer	  to	  Britain’s	  financial	  sector	  metonymically	  as	  simply,	  “The	  City.”	  Only	  with	  William’s	  Financial	  Revolution	  would	  a	  modern	  banking	  sector	  in	  England	  emerge	  through	  the	  financial	  practices	  he	  imported	  from	  continental	  Europe.	  	  	  
In	  1640	  when	  Charles	  I	  seized	  all	  the	  coins	  deposited	  by	  merchants	  in	  the	  Tower	  of	  London	  for	  safekeeping	  he	  exposed	  the	  incredible	  weakness	  and	  archaic	  nature	  of	  the	  British	  banking	  sector.	  	  His	  action	  demonstrated	  to	  many	  merchants	  that	  the	  crown	  could	  not	  be	  trusted,	  but	  also	  that	  banks	  were	  not	  a	  reliable	  place	  to	  store	  their	  money.4	  	  So	  feeble	  were	  the	  banks	  there	  that	  they	  relied	  upon	  the	  Tower	  of	  London	  for	  storage,	  and	  could	  not	  perform	  their	  primary	  mission	  –	  serving	  as	  a	  place	  for	  the	  safekeeping	  of	  assets.	  	  
The	  seizure	  of	  this	  wealth	  forced	  merchants	  to	  begin	  developing	  an	  alternate	  solution.	  	  After	  this	  seizure,	  goldsmith-­‐bankers	  became	  the	  primary	  location	  for	  merchants’	  deposit.	  	  The	  goldsmith	  bankers	  began	  using	  a	  fractional	  reserve	  system	  that	  underpins	  the	  modern-­‐day	  banking	  system.5	  	  In	  a	  fractional	  reserve	  system,	  a	  bank	  has	  a	  reserve	  of	  cash	  of	  which	  it	  only	  keeps	  a	  small	  portion	  and	  makes	  loans	  and	  investments	  with	  the	  rest.	  	  To	  encourage	  the	  deposit	  of	  gold	  with	  them,	  the	  goldsmith-­‐bankers	  paid	  depositors,	  “four	  
Angle	  6	  pence	  the	  day	  interest	  per	  centum.”6	  These	  goldsmith-­‐bankers	  also	  provided	  basic	  investment	  mechanisms	  and	  issued	  their	  own	  forms	  of	  bills	  and	  notes.	  	  In	  the	  later	  seventeenth	  century	  these	  bankers	  evolved	  into	  more	  modern-­‐appearing	  banks,	  and	  the	  bills	  that	  they	  issued	  held	  enormous	  credibility	  among	  businesspeople.7	  	  Although	  many	  of	  their	  practices	  were	  proto-­‐modern,	  the	  goldsmith	  bankers	  were	  too	  small,	  too	  numerous,	  and	  too	  primitive	  to	  take	  Britain	  into	  the	  modern	  era.	  	  The	  banks	  made	  loans	  to	  the	  government,	  but,	  as	  government	  spending	  dramatically	  increased	  due	  to	  wars	  late	  in	  the	  century,	  the	  goldsmith-­‐bankers	  could	  no	  longer	  lend	  enough	  to	  sustain	  the	  government.8	  	  This	  delta	  between	  private	  lenders’	  ability	  to	  loan	  to	  the	  government	  and	  their	  spending	  needs	  demanded	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  eventually	  emerge	  in	  William’s	  national	  bank.	  	  
Seventeenth-­‐century	  England	  also	  experienced	  a	  cyclical	  shortage	  of	  hard	  currency.	  This	  shortage	  stemmed	  from	  England’s	  large	  trade	  deficit,	  which	  occurred	  as	  England	  purchased	  large	  quantities	  of	  goods	  from	  foreign	  nations	  to	  supply	  their	  armies	  in	  the	  field	  on	  the	  continent.	  These	  deficits	  had	  to	  be	  settled	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  silver	  bullion	  and	  gold	  coins	  shipped	  abroad.	  	  British	  economic	  development	  was	  significantly	  impeded	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  hard	  currency.	  	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  however,	  several	  new	  expedients	  designed	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  currency	  emerged.	  	  First,	  individuals	  created	  bills	  of	  exchange	  to	  implement	  transactions.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  1640s,	  Sir	  William	  Cavendish,	  a	  nobleman	  with	  wool	  interests,	  was	  not	  able	  to	  transport	  £13,500	  in	  coin	  from	  Derbyshire	  to	  London,	  so	  he	  utilized	  a	  bill	  of	  exchange	  between	  another	  merchant	  and	  himself.9	  	  Slowly	  but	  steadily,	  bills	  like	  Cavendish’s	  became	  more	  and	  more	  accepted	  and	  emerged	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  currency	  among	  merchants.	  	  The	  bills	  became	  uniform	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  “inland	  
Angle	  7	  bill	  of	  exchange,”	  which	  standardized	  the	  writing	  and	  signing	  of	  the	  bill.10	  	  The	  development	  of	  these	  bills	  was	  a	  not	  only	  harbinger	  of	  future	  currency	  developments,	  but	  also	  allowed	  merchants	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	  currency.	  Another	  simpler	  solution	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  currency	  circulating	  involved	  the	  cutting	  of	  coins	  into	  smaller	  pieces.	  	  The	  coins	  commonly	  were	  stripped	  of	  up	  to	  forty	  percent	  of	  their	  metal	  content.11	  	  This	  obviously	  devalued	  the	  coins,	  but	  more	  seriously,	  caused	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  government	  behind	  them.	  D.W.	  Jones,	  who	  extensively	  studied	  these	  balances	  of	  payment	  in	  this	  period,	  argues	  that	  the	  clipping	  of	  coins	  for	  their	  silver	  content	  in	  the	  period,	  nevertheless,	  allowed	  Britain’s	  economy	  to	  limp	  along	  economically.	  	  It	  could	  just	  manage	  to	  meet	  its	  international	  obligations	  while	  also	  sustaining	  trade	  at	  home.12	  
Despite	  these	  problems,	  the	  underlying	  foundation	  of	  the	  English	  economy	  was	  fairly	  strong,	  particularly	  because	  a	  strong,	  uniform	  internal	  market	  boosted	  it.	  	  This	  internal	  market	  developed	  around	  the	  markets	  of	  metropolitan	  areas.	  	  Leading	  the	  internal	  market’s	  development	  and	  standardization	  was	  the	  wool	  market.	  	  The	  great	  demand	  for	  English	  wool	  helped	  fuel	  the	  building	  of	  roads,	  long-­‐distance	  money	  carriers,	  and	  some	  financial	  institutions	  to	  deal	  with	  money	  on	  credit	  and	  short-­‐term	  debts.	  	  Together,	  these	  developments	  resulted	  in	  one	  market	  throughout	  the	  British	  Isles.	  	  Then	  	  -­‐	  mainly	  radiating	  from	  London	  -­‐	  the	  extended	  or	  extra-­‐metropolitan	  market	  existed	  through	  exports	  oversea.13	  For	  Britain,	  this	  meant	  a	  vibrant	  internal	  trade,	  but	  a	  failure	  to	  translate	  their	  domestic	  economy	  into	  broad	  strength	  due	  to	  the	  underdeveloped	  financial	  sector	  and	  lack	  of	  currency	  liquidity.	  	  
Although	  the	  reigning	  Stuart	  monarchs	  attempted	  positive	  policies,	  they	  were	  not	  particularly	  well	  implemented	  or	  successful.	  An	  example	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  free-­‐trade	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  zones.	  In	  response	  to	  growing	  Dutch	  power,	  Parliament,	  led	  by	  King	  James	  II,	  attempted	  to	  develop	  entrepôts,	  or	  free	  trade	  zones,	  similar	  to	  those	  which	  had	  grown	  up	  spontaneously	  near	  Amsterdam.14	  	  These	  government-­‐fostered	  free	  trade	  zones	  in	  London	  were	  not	  successful	  in	  the	  immediate-­‐term	  in	  advancing	  the	  British	  economy.15	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  exactly	  why	  they	  did	  not	  prosper,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  difference	  lay	  in	  either	  other	  macroeconomic	  factors	  or	  the	  difference	  between	  organic	  and	  government-­‐fostered	  free-­‐trade	  zones.	  	  
Additionally,	  Charles	  II,	  recognizing	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  English	  financial	  system	  and	  the	  ever	  growing	  Currency	  Crisis,	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  attempted	  to	  address	  these	  failures.	  One	  such	  example	  involved	  the	  Crown	  pushing	  for	  paper	  bills	  to	  replace	  actual	  specie	  in	  business	  transactions	  to	  ease	  pressures	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  currency	  that	  were	  beginning	  to	  emerge.	  Memoirs	  from	  the	  time	  reveal	  popular	  resistance	  to	  this	  policy:	  “though	  paper	  credit,	  such	  as	  bank	  notes…	  do	  pass	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London…	  real	  specie	  is	  necessary	  	  [in]	  the	  country,”	  and	  “country	  people.	  .	  .	  will	  [therefore]	  never	  take	  their	  paper	  in	  payments.”16	  This	  lack	  of	  currency	  grew	  more	  problematic	  each	  year	  and	  became	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  challenges	  of	  William’s	  reign.	  	  	  
Charles	  II	  proposed	  a	  solution	  to	  Parliament	  in	  1673	  to	  address	  the	  growing	  Currency	  Crisis	  and	  to	  modernize	  banking.	  	  His	  proposal	  would	  have	  allowed	  him	  to	  spend	  more	  than	  the	  government	  brought	  in	  annually	  by	  using	  more	  paper	  money.	  	  He	  also	  proposed	  building	  a	  system	  of	  “publick	  and	  private	  banks”	  that	  handled	  large	  transactions	  and	  ensured	  that	  they	  were	  “fairly	  registered,	  and	  put	  to	  each	  man’s	  account.”17	  	  These	  banks	  were,	  “in	  the	  most	  convenient	  parts	  of	  the	  Kingdom,	  [to]	  be	  erected,	  where	  all	  receipts	  and	  payments	  to	  and	  from	  the	  Crown.	  .	  .	  may	  be	  respectively	  made.”	  	  He	  also	  
Angle	  9	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  bills	  in	  small	  denominations	  for	  everyday	  transactions,	  claiming	  they	  constituted	  “a	  new	  specie	  of	  money”	  backed	  by	  the	  king’s	  credit	  and	  valid	  for	  all	  transactions.18	  	  Charles	  seemed	  to	  hope	  that	  the	  banks	  and	  their	  depositors	  would	  handle	  their	  large	  transactions	  internally,	  not	  utilizing	  currency	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  the	  bills	  would	  proliferate	  and	  reduce	  the	  need	  for	  coinage.19	  	  Parliament	  did	  not	  embrace	  his	  solution,	  and	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  continued	  largely	  unabated	  because	  of	  inadequate	  measures.	  	  So	  despite	  Charles’s	  initiatives,	  by	  mid	  century	  only	  limited	  success	  had	  been	  achieved	  in	  modernizing	  the	  English	  banking	  and	  monetary	  system.	  While	  these	  policies	  could	  have	  solved	  some	  of	  the	  currency	  problem,	  they	  were	  either	  not	  embraced	  fully	  or	  not	  adopted	  at	  all.	  	  Merchants’	  observance	  of	  the	  ineptitude	  of	  the	  Stuart	  kings	  in	  addressing	  these	  ever-­‐growing	  issues	  likely	  led	  them	  to	  support	  William’s	  invasion.	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  Dutch	  government	  during	  the	  same	  period	  advocated	  for	  their	  businesses,	  and	  this	  did	  not	  go	  unremarked	  by	  the	  Stuart	  Kings.	  	  Even	  though	  their	  measures	  were	  not	  entirely	  successful,	  the	  Stuart	  kings	  likely	  modeled	  them	  on	  their	  more	  successful	  Dutch	  counterparts,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Charles	  II’s	  banking	  changes	  and	  James’s	  entrepôts.	  However,	  true	  emulation	  of	  Dutch	  economic	  and	  fiscal	  police	  would	  require	  a	  Dutch	  ruler	  brought	  to	  power	  by	  the	  English	  merchants.	  	  	  	  
Part	  I.B.	  :	  	   The	  Dutch	  Model	  Dutch	  economic	  development	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  offered	  a	  starkly	  contrasting	  pattern	  of	  development	  to	  England’s	  plodding	  one.	  	  In	  the	  mid-­‐seventeenth	  century,	  the	  United	  Provinces	  were	  unquestionably	  the	  leading	  commercial	  and	  banking	  power,	  and	  Amsterdam	  was	  Europe’s	  financial	  and	  commercial	  hub.	  	  This	  foil	  to	  England	  perhaps	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  explains,	  in	  part,	  the	  allure	  William	  of	  Orange	  may	  have	  had	  for	  the	  English	  merchants,	  envious	  of	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  his	  policies	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  which	  had	  produced	  a	  diverse	  and	  booming	  economy.20	  	  The	  Dutch	  had	  established	  a	  national	  bank	  before	  nearly	  any	  other	  nation,	  created	  an	  efficient	  taxation	  system,	  sustained	  a	  national	  debt,	  and	  developed,	  as	  early	  as	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  a	  highly	  monetized	  economy	  with	  different	  currencies	  for	  domestic	  and	  international	  use.21	  	  The	  nation	  based	  its	  economy	  on	  the	  use	  of	  coins	  and	  money	  in	  everyday	  life,	  and	  their	  merchants	  saved	  and	  invested	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  These	  developments	  gave	  the	  Dutch	  great	  economic	  power	  in	  the	  mercantilist	  currency-­‐based	  era	  as	  “[t]he	  Republic’s	  per	  capita	  money	  supply	  [was]	  nearly	  double	  that	  of	  England	  and	  triple	  that	  of	  France”	  at	  end	  of	  seventeenth	  century	  with	  high	  rates	  of	  domestic	  saving.22	  	  	  The	  emerging	  middle	  class	  of	  Dutch	  merchants	  actively	  supported	  the	  Bank	  of	  Amsterdam	  –	  the	  Wisselbank	  –	  which	  intended	  its	  founding	  in	  1609	  to	  be	  a	  convenience	  for	  and	  promoter	  of	  merchants’	  interests.	  	  To	  advance	  the	  banking	  system,	  the	  bank	  also	  created	  investment	  products	  intended	  for	  middle	  class	  purchase.23	  	  The	  Wisselbank	  sold	  three	  types	  of	  debt	  to	  the	  public	  -­‐	  Obligatien,	  Losrenten,	  and	  Lijfrenten.	  The	  first	  were	  short-­‐term	  negotiable	  bonds;	  the	  second	  were	  redeemable	  perpetual	  bonds;	  and	  third	  were	  life	  annuities	  which	  were	  self-­‐amortizing	  loans.24	  	  Among	  contemporary	  middle	  class	  Dutch,	  it	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  class	  and	  status	  to	  own	  bonds.	  	  The	  debt	  certificates	  would	  be	  displayed	  alongside	  art	  in	  homes	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  family’s	  status	  and	  national	  pride.25	  	  Widespread	  bond	  purchase	  and	  ownership	  from	  the	  national	  bank	  was	  an	  especially	  important	  commercial	  development	  as	  it	  allowed	  the	  Dutch	  to	  finance	  their	  wars	  with	  a	  lower	  tax	  burden	  than	  would	  be	  otherwise	  required.	  	  Moreover,	  these	  early	  forms	  of	  debt	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  products	  created	  the	  basis	  of	  banking	  and	  finance.	  	  This	  system	  of	  monetization,	  national	  bank,	  and	  investment	  securities	  became	  a	  powerhouse	  that	  the	  British	  envied	  and	  later	  implemented	  after	  the	  accession	  of	  Dutch	  rulers.	  	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  creating	  a	  powerful	  monetary	  and	  banking	  system,	  the	  mid-­‐seventeenth-­‐century	  Dutch	  were	  also	  leaders	  in	  tax	  policy.	  	  They	  created	  an	  effective	  tax	  system	  early	  on,	  based	  on	  excises	  known	  as	  gemene	  middelen,	  that	  was	  generally	  predictable	  but	  also	  raised	  or	  lowered	  quickly.	  	  Additionally,	  according	  to	  Dutch	  economic	  historian	  Jan	  De	  Vries’	  research,	  these	  indirect	  excise	  taxes	  “deflected	  public	  anger	  from	  the	  regents	  and	  their	  government.”26	  Although	  excise	  taxes	  made	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  collections,	  the	  Dutch	  taxed	  both	  broadly	  and	  deeply:	  taxes	  were	  levied	  on	  income,	  wealth,	  and	  trade.27	  	  Ellis	  Verryard,	  an	  Englishman	  travelling	  though	  Holland	  in	  the	  1670s,	  commented	  that	  “[t]hough	  the	  people	  boast	  of	  their	  Free	  State,	  I	  am	  confident	  no	  subjects	  in	  the	  world	  are	  more	  burdened	  with	  taxes	  then	  they….	  [T]here	  comes	  not	  a	  joint	  of	  meat	  to	  their	  tables	  but	  what	  has	  paid	  excise	  at	  least	  18	  or	  20	  times.”28	  	  Thus,	  effective	  tax	  collection	  and	  advanced	  tax	  policy	  also	  served	  as	  a	  contributed	  to	  Dutch	  economic	  success.	  	  	  	   All	  of	  these	  policies	  had	  fostered	  Dutch	  economic	  growth.	  	  Thus,	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  the	  Dutch	  were	  clearly	  innovators	  in	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  policies,	  while	  the	  English	  were	  hamstrung	  by	  their	  antiquated	  systems.	  	  The	  Dutch	  monetized	  economy	  and	  national	  bank,	  along	  with	  widespread	  rates	  of	  securities	  ownership	  allowed	  them	  to	  finance	  expensive	  wars	  without	  suppressing	  domestic	  consumption	  with	  high	  taxes.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  English	  could	  barely	  run	  their	  economy	  due	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	  currency	  and	  a	  feeble	  banking	  sector.	  	  Although	  the	  Stuarts	  had	  attempted	  to	  institute	  Dutch-­‐style	  reforms,	  a	  hostile	  Parliament	  and	  public	  resisted	  them.	  	  Only	  a	  coup	  d’etat	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  bringing	  Dutch	  rulers	  and	  policies	  to	  England	  could	  resolve	  the	  logjam	  preventing	  English	  fiscal	  policy	  from	  advancing	  into	  modernity.	  	  	  
Part	  I.C.	  :	   The	  Immortal	  Seven	  and	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  Although	  conventionally	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  event,	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  of	  1688	  fundamentally	  transformed	  the	  British	  economy.	  	  The	  economic	  interests	  of	  those	  individual	  actors	  behind	  the	  invitation	  have	  been	  largely	  overlooked	  in	  most	  histories	  of	  this	  event.	  	  As	  discussed,	  Britain	  in	  this	  period	  experienced	  plodding	  economic	  growth	  and	  an	  archaic	  financial	  sector,	  while	  their	  neighbors	  the	  Dutch	  had	  rulers	  who	  successfully	  expanded	  commerce	  and	  advocated	  for	  merchant	  interests.	  	  	  
This	  paper	  argues	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  –	  those	  English	  elite	  who	  invited	  William	  to	  invade	  England	  -­‐	  were	  influenced	  primarily	  by	  economic	  interests.	  	  They	  could	  not	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  their	  government	  to	  protect	  and	  advocate	  for	  commerce.	  But	  the	  Seven	  directly	  reflected	  the	  greater	  commercial	  concerns	  of	  the	  emerging	  New	  London	  Merchants.	  The	  merchants	  then	  looked	  to	  William	  of	  Orange	  to	  remedy	  what	  was	  wrong	  with	  the	  English	  economy	  and	  to	  address	  specific	  problems,	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  national	  debt,	  national	  bank,	  financial	  products,	  and	  the	  shortage	  of	  hard	  currency,	  by	  applying	  a	  Dutch	  model.	  	  Additionally,	  small	  merchants	  wanted	  a	  government	  that	  would	  advocate	  English	  commercial	  development	  and	  advance	  small	  traders,	  as	  the	  Dutch	  had	  done,	  rather	  simply	  promoting	  than	  large	  monopolies.	  	  These	  economic	  interests	  were	  as	  significant	  as	  political	  and	  religious	  considerations	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  as	  well	  as	  in	  its	  impact.	  	  
Angle	  13	  This	  gap	  in	  economic	  development	  has	  rarely	  been	  acknowledged	  as	  impetus	  to	  the	  significant	  event	  that	  changed	  English	  politics,	  religion,	  and	  dynasty.	  	  In	  1688	  a	  group	  of	  seven	  nobles	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  William	  inviting	  him	  to	  invade	  and	  pledged	  their	  support.	  	  	  While	  scholars	  have	  analyzed	  their	  religious	  movies	  for	  this	  invitation	  at	  great	  length,	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  had	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  as	  well.29	  	  These	  economic	  concerns,	  as	  this	  paper	  argues,	  were	  those	  that	  truly	  propelled	  the	  Seven	  into	  action.	  Even	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Immortal	  Seven’s	  invitation	  to	  William	  III	  supports	  this	  conclusion	  that	  their	  motivations	  were	  less	  a	  theological	  plea	  to	  a	  like-­‐minded	  religious	  reformer	  and	  more	  a	  secular	  appraisal	  of	  the	  economic	  advantage	  a	  change	  of	  ruler	  might	  produce.	  	  The	  letter	  began	  by	  expressing	  displeasure	  with	  James,	  “[t]he	  people	  are	  so	  greatly	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  present	  conduct	  of	  the	  government	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  religion,	  liberties	  and	  properties	  (all	  which	  have	  been	  greatly	  invaded),	  and	  they	  are	  in	  such	  expectations	  of	  their	  prospects	  being	  daily	  worse,	  that	  your	  Highness	  may	  be	  assured	  there	  are	  nineteen	  parts	  of	  twenty	  of	  the	  kingdom	  who	  are	  desirous	  of	  a	  change.”30	  	  The	  letter	  described	  how	  they	  believed	  an	  invasion	  should	  occur	  and	  the	  support	  they	  would	  lend	  him,	  including	  mentioning	  that	  “we	  do	  upon	  very	  good	  grounds	  believe	  that	  [James	  II’s]	  army	  would	  then	  be	  very	  much	  divided.”31	  	  	  
An	  important	  aspect	  of	  their	  letter	  is	  that	  they	  had	  to	  appeal	  to	  William	  because	  their	  small,	  proprietary	  militias	  were	  no	  longer	  strong	  enough	  to	  remove	  James	  on	  their	  own.	  	  Although	  the	  letter	  mentioned	  that	  religion	  was	  infringed	  upon,	  it	  also	  specifically	  cites	  land	  and	  properties.	  	  The	  invitation,	  as	  a	  whole,	  is	  less	  that	  of	  a	  group	  of	  ideologues	  begging	  their	  co-­‐religionist	  to	  save	  Protestantism	  than	  a	  cool,	  calculated	  military	  plan.	  	  To	  fully	  understand	  their	  motivations	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  William’s	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  invasion	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  many	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Immortal	  Seven”	  who	  invited	  him	  to	  England	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intellectual	  context	  of	  the	  era	  that	  underpinned	  their	  actions.32	  	  	  
Importantly,	  the	  merchants	  who	  brought	  William	  to	  the	  throne	  benefitted	  after	  the	  revolution	  from	  significantly	  greater	  influence	  on	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policies	  imported	  from	  Holland	  that	  promoted	  commerce	  generally	  and	  their	  own	  interests	  in	  particular.33	  
Part	  I.C.i	  :	   John	  Locke	  and	  the	  Intellectual	  Context	  of	  the	  Age	  Framing	  this	  time	  period	  intellectually	  is	  John	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  published	  in	  1689.	  	  These	  texts	  were	  written	  at	  roughly	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Immortal	  Seven’s	  invitation	  and	  echoes	  many	  of	  the	  same	  themes.	  	  Locke,	  like	  the	  Seven,	  focused	  on	  the	  public	  good,	  protection	  of	  property	  rights,	  and	  the	  limitations	  of	  rulers.	  	  His	  beliefs	  and	  writings	  reflect	  the	  sentiments	  of	  the	  English	  elite	  who	  invited	  William	  and	  elucidate	  the	  sort	  of	  government	  that	  should	  exist	  in	  England.	  	  
Although	  the	  Two	  Treatises	  are	  traditionally	  viewed	  as	  an	  ex	  post	  facto	  justification	  of	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  invasion	  of	  England,	  more	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  contradicted	  that	  belief.	  	  Instead,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  Locke’s	  exposure	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  William	  of	  Orange	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  inspired	  his	  Two	  Treatises.	  	  Locke	  spent	  several	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  publication	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  more	  contemporary	  scholarship	  suggests	  the	  First	  Treatise	  was	  written	  there	  around	  1683.34	  	  Almost	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  was	  composed	  there,	  and	  “[i]t	  may	  be	  fairly	  assumed	  that	  the	  whole	  work	  was	  substantially	  completed	  during	  Locke’s	  last	  year	  or	  so	  of	  residence	  in	  Holland”	  in	  late	  1688.35	  	  With	  this	  timeline	  in	  mind,	  Locke’s	  call	  for	  a	  new	  relationship	  between	  government	  and	  governed,	  state	  and	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  citizen	  is	  more	  “a	  demand	  for	  revolution	  to	  be	  brought	  about,	  [than]	  the	  rationalization	  of	  a	  revolution	  in	  need	  of	  defense,”	  according	  to	  esteemed	  Locke	  scholar	  Peter	  Laslett.36	  	  	  Tellingly,	  the	  time	  and	  location	  in	  which	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  was	  the	  United	  Provinces	  of	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  He	  carried	  that	  nation’s	  political	  ideals	  with	  him	  back	  to	  Britain,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  appreciation	  of	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  economic	  policies.	  	  Locke’s	  conception	  of	  government	  in	  the	  Two	  Treatises	  demonstrates	  the	  anxieties	  and	  issues	  provoked	  by	  England’s	  political	  and	  economic	  situation	  at	  that	  time.	  	  	  Interestingly,	  Locke’s	  language	  in	  the	  treatise	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Thomas	  Osborne’s.	  	  Osborne,	  	  one	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Immortal	  Seven,	  wrote	  Thoughts	  of	  a	  Private	  Person	  to	  justify	  subjects’	  right	  to	  rebel	  against	  James	  II.	  	  Osborne’s	  letter	  also	  elucidated	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  more	  limited	  government	  as	  focused	  on	  property	  protection	  and	  advocacy	  of	  the	  “publick	  good,”	  and	  framed	  opposition	  to	  James	  II’s	  rule.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  a	  connection	  between	  Locke	  and	  Osborne,	  both	  men	  critiqued	  the	  contemporary	  government’s	  policies	  towards	  property	  in	  order	  to	  re-­‐conceptualize	  the	  nature	  of	  government.	  	  Throughout	  the	  Treatise,	  Locke	  bases	  his	  conceptualization	  of	  government	  fundamentally	  on	  protection	  of	  property.	  	  The	  respect	  for	  property	  rights	  is	  central	  to	  his	  concept	  of	  society	  and	  government.	  In	  fact,	  he	  refers	  to	  them	  several	  hundred	  times	  in	  his	  essays,	  underscoring	  their	  enormous	  importance	  to	  him.37	  	  This	  repetition	  and	  re-­‐conceptualization	  reflects	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  property	  to	  Locke’s	  understanding	  of	  government.	  	  Locke	  may	  have	  seen	  such	  rights	  as	  threatened	  in	  Jacobite	  England	  as	  an	  exiled	  Briton.	  	  For	  example,	  Locke	  asserts,	  "The	  reason	  why	  men	  enter	  into	  society,	  is	  the	  preservation	  of	  their	  property”	  and	  that	  a	  person’s	  labor	  and	  personality	  merit	  special	  protections	  from	  the	  government.38	  	  His	  conceptualization	  of	  government	  is	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  one	  with	  appropriate	  powers	  designed	  to,	  “be	  directed	  to	  no	  other	  end,	  but	  the	  peace,	  safety,	  and	  public	  good	  of	  the	  people.”39	  	  Locke’s	  views	  of	  government’s	  rights	  and	  obligations	  were	  based	  on	  his	  experiences	  in	  seventeenth	  century	  Britain,	  but	  were	  also	  influential	  in	  both	  the	  re-­‐conceptualization	  of	  monarchy	  after	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  and	  in	  the	  American	  Revolution	  nearly	  a	  century	  later.	  	  
Part	  I.C.ii:	   Outcomes	  for	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  after	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  Members	  of	  the	  Seven	  were	  individually	  not	  only	  connected	  to	  the	  change	  of	  regime	  for	  ideological	  reasons;	  many	  directly	  benefitted	  from	  their	  involvement.	  	  One	  can	  look	  to	  the	  backgrounds	  and	  later	  lives	  of	  the	  “Immortal	  Seven”	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  motives,	  rather	  than	  the	  traditionally	  presumed	  religious	  ones	  might	  have	  played	  in	  their	  support	  for	  William.	  	  	  
Charles	  Talbot,	  the	  Earl	  of	  Shrewsbury,	  has	  not	  left	  political	  writings,	  but	  after	  the	  revolution	  he	  was	  given	  the	  position	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  in	  the	  king’s	  new	  court.	  	  Henry	  Sidney,	  likewise,	  has	  very	  few	  writings	  attributed	  to	  him	  before	  the	  revolution,	  but	  later	  emerged	  as	  a	  powerful	  leader	  in	  the	  army.	  	  William	  III	  made	  him	  a	  part	  of	  his	  cabinet	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State.40	  Only	  Lord	  of	  Lumley	  appears	  not	  to	  have	  benefitted	  directly	  from	  his	  support	  of	  the	  revolution.	  	  	  Edward	  Russell	  has	  left	  almost	  no	  record	  from	  before	  the	  war.	  	  However,	  after	  supporting	  the	  revolution,	  he	  became	  the	  head	  of	  the	  admiralty	  and	  took	  the	  navy	  into	  battle	  against	  the	  French.	  	  William	  Cavendish,	  Earl	  of	  Devonshire,	  became	  the	  Lord	  High	  Steward	  after	  William	  became	  king.	  	  According	  to	  Tony	  Claydon,	  his	  involvement	  in	  the	  group	  of	  Seven	  clearly	  was	  economically	  motivated	  in	  part	  because	  he	  was	  “[a]	  Whig	  who	  had	  been	  excluded	  from	  court	  posts	  in	  previous	  reigns.	  [Cavendish]	  thus	  resented	  the	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  [his]	  opponents	  had	  gained	  in	  office	  before	  the	  Revolution,”	  and	  viewed	  supporting	  William	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  “secure	  [his]	  own	  share	  of	  the	  reward.”41	  	  Finally,	  Henry	  Compton	  was	  the	  bishop	  of	  London	  during	  James	  II’s	  reign,	  and	  was	  an	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  the	  king.	  	  He	  was	  tried	  for	  seditious	  libel	  and	  acquitted.	  	  The	  very	  next	  day	  met	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  and	  issued	  the	  invitation	  to	  William.	  	  As	  clergyman,	  he	  was	  certainly	  motivated	  by	  religious	  zeal,	  but	  he	  also	  had	  a	  financial	  incentive	  for	  Anglicanism	  to	  remain	  the	  state	  religion	  and	  for	  Catholics	  to	  remain	  marginalized.42	  	  Thus	  most	  of	  the	  Seven	  benefitted	  directly	  from	  their	  support	  for	  William	  subsequent	  to	  the	  revolution.	  	  	  
Thomas	  Osborne,	  the	  Earl	  of	  Danby,	  left	  documents	  and	  records	  that	  made	  his	  feelings	  on	  the	  issue	  very	  clear	  in	  the	  historical	  record.	  	  His	  public	  letter	  “The	  thoughts	  of	  a	  
private	  person,	  about	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  gentlemen’s	  undertaking	  at	  York,	  Nov.	  1688	  wherein	  is	  
shewed,	  that	  it	  is	  neither	  against	  scripture,	  nor	  moral	  honesty,	  to	  defend	  their	  just	  and	  legal	  
rights,	  against	  the	  illegal	  invaders	  of	  them:	  occasioned	  then	  by	  some	  private	  debates,	  and	  now	  
submitted	  to	  better	  judgments”	  lays	  out	  his	  justification	  for	  the	  revolt,	  arguing	  both	  the	  righteousness	  and	  legality	  of	  the	  invasion.	  	  His	  letter	  is	  as	  much	  a	  political	  treatise	  as	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  invasion.	  	  He	  lays	  out	  a	  defense	  of	  limited	  government,	  checks	  and	  balances,	  and	  the	  right	  of	  subjects	  to	  rise	  up	  against	  tyranny.	  	  The	  tone	  of	  the	  entire	  letter	  echoes	  that	  of	  John	  Locke.	  	  It	  advocated	  for	  a	  government	  with	  a	  limited	  monarch	  promoting	  national	  defense,	  “publick	  good,”	  and	  property	  rights	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  governed.	  	  Although	  Osborne	  speaks	  of	  God	  and	  religion	  as	  justification	  for	  resistance	  to	  the	  king,	  the	  letter’s	  subject	  and	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  the	  religion	  of	  either	  James	  or	  William	  but	  rather	  an	  ideal	  government.	  	  His	  letter’s	  similarity	  to	  many	  of	  Locke’s	  points	  is	  significant:	  they	  both	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  support	  similar	  conclusion	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  government	  founded	  to	  protect	  property	  interests.	  	  	  
Osborne’s	  letter	  explicitly	  emphasizes	  protecting	  property	  from	  the	  incursions	  of	  James	  II	  and	  scarcely	  mentions	  his	  assaults	  on	  the	  Anglican	  religion.	  In	  fact,	  he	  mentioned	  “Popery,”	  “Papists,”	  “Jesuites,	  and	  “Protestants”	  one	  time	  each.	  	  In	  contrast,	  he	  wrote	  at	  great	  length	  about	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  property,	  mentioning	  it	  over	  a	  dozen	  times.43	  	  The	  discrepancy	  is	  significant	  as	  it	  further	  bolsters	  the	  argument	  that	  these	  men	  were	  not	  moved	  to	  support	  William	  due	  to	  primarily	  religious	  motives,	  but	  rather	  were	  led	  by	  commercial	  and	  property-­‐based	  interests.	  	  Most	  tellingly	  to	  his	  overall	  point,	  Osborne’s	  discussed	  his	  main	  focus,	  the	  “publick	  good,”	  in	  dozens	  of	  occasions	  throughout	  his	  pamphlet,	  and	  argued	  that	  a	  ruler	  must	  maximize	  the	  public	  good	  and	  seek	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  governed.	  	  He	  also	  trusted	  a	  monarch	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  maximizing	  the	  “public	  treasure”	  and	  ensuring	  the	  financial	  wellbeing	  of	  his	  citizens.	  	  This	  economic	  argument	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Seven’s	  significant,	  economically	  based	  motives	  for	  supporting	  William.	  	  
Osborne	  compares	  the	  contemporary	  regime	  of	  James	  II	  to	  that	  of	  a	  burglar	  in	  a	  home	  and	  argued	  that	  citizens,	  “have	  [a]	  right	  to	  defend	  themselves,	  not	  only	  against	  the	  private	  assailant,	  which	  is	  allowed	  in	  all	  Governments,	  but	  also	  against	  illegal	  force.”44	  Later	  Osborne	  asserted	  that	  opposing	  the	  government	  in	  defense	  of	  one’s	  property	  is	  the	  only	  acceptable	  course	  if	  it	  were	  infringed	  upon.	  	  However,	  	  “[h]ad	  the	  King	  an	  arbitrary	  power,	  which	  he	  did	  abuse	  to	  vex	  the	  Protestants,	  I	  for	  my	  part	  should	  think	  myself	  obliged	  to	  suffer	  and	  not	  resist.”45	  Thus,	  he	  explicitly	  claimed	  that	  opposing	  the	  king	  on	  solely	  religious	  grounds	  would	  not	  be	  legitimate,	  but	  that,	  by	  contrast,	  property	  rights	  were	  valid	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  reasons	  to	  depose	  a	  king.	  	  Osborne	  closed	  in	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  Seven	  by	  arguing,	  “I	  cannot	  but	  conclude	  it	  is	  a	  very	  worthy	  and	  virtuous	  act	  to	  be	  in	  arms	  for	  defence	  of	  the	  laws,	  the	  kings’	  just	  rights	  and	  the	  publick	  good;	  and	  consequently	  that	  those	  gentlemen,	  who	  are	  in	  arms	  for	  defence	  of	  our	  laws,	  liberties,	  and	  lives	  against	  illegal	  forces,	  arbitrary	  commands,	  and	  usurped	  powers,	  are	  in	  a	  virtuous	  post.”46	  	  Throughout	  the	  letter,	  he	  laid	  out	  clearly	  that	  the	  struggle	  against	  James	  is	  for	  limited	  government,	  defense	  of	  property	  rights,	  and	  morality.	  	  His	  argument	  explicitly	  failed	  to	  endorse	  religion	  as	  the	  legitimate	  rationale	  for	  revolt,	  but	  instead	  developed	  an	  alternate	  theory	  for	  the	  role	  of	  government	  and	  right	  to	  revolt.	  	  
The	  few	  documents	  produced	  by	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  infrequently	  mention	  religion	  as	  a	  factor	  to	  their	  support	  of	  the	  regime	  change.	  This	  lack	  of	  emphasis	  on	  religion	  is	  striking.	  	  Historians	  have	  long	  asserted	  religious	  zeal	  as	  the	  Seven’s	  motivation	  for	  their	  financial	  and	  material	  support	  of	  William’s	  invasion	  as	  opposed	  to	  cold	  calculation	  of	  economic	  gain	  or	  financial	  incentive.	  	  This	  oversight	  is	  surprising,	  for,	  as	  Wilfred	  Priest	  points	  out,	  James’s	  regime	  economically	  threatened	  the	  Anglican	  clergy,	  Tory	  landholders,	  army	  officers,	  and	  university	  dons.	  	  These	  groups	  together	  created	  a	  powerful	  dispossessed	  base	  to	  oppose	  his	  reign.47	  	  Since	  many	  the	  Seven	  were	  drawn	  from	  these	  groups,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  they	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  James’s	  policies	  on	  their	  finances.	  	  	  Many	  of	  them	  had	  major	  commercial	  interests	  and	  landownings	  and	  would	  likely	  have	  been	  motivated	  to	  bring	  to	  England	  the	  successful	  economic	  policies	  of	  the	  rival	  Dutch.	  	  While	  the	  Seven	  were	  part	  of	  traditional	  English	  elite,	  their	  economic	  concerns	  were	  shared	  by	  the	  emerging	  New	  London	  Merchants.	  	  It	  was	  these	  economic	  interests	  that	  led	  them	  to	  support	  a	  change	  in	  government	  to	  one	  known	  for	  its	  success	  in	  promoting	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  trade	  and	  commerce	  –	  William’s.	  	  To	  reform	  the	  backward	  English	  economy	  –	  marked	  by	  its	  feeble	  banking	  sector,	  lack	  of	  national	  debt	  or	  bank,	  and	  absence	  of	  hard	  currency	  -­‐-­‐	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  wait	  for	  the	  Stuarts’	  ineffectual	  emulation	  of	  Dutch	  policies.	  	  Real	  reform	  required	  a	  Dutch	  ruler	  installed	  by	  English	  traditional	  elite.	  	  	  
Part	  I.D:	   Dutch	  Designs	  and	  Motivations	  The	  Dutch	  too	  supported	  William’s	  invasion	  of	  England	  with	  primarily	  economic	  considerations	  underpinning	  their	  support.	  	  Rather	  than	  having	  the	  English	  engage	  them	  in	  additional	  wars	  over	  trade	  –	  like	  the	  three	  wars	  over	  the	  previous	  four	  decades	  -­‐	  they	  would	  instead	  have	  a	  sympathetic	  king	  ruling	  on	  the	  English	  throne	  if	  William	  became	  King	  of	  England.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  strategy	  it	  also	  removed	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  Anglo-­‐French	  alliance	  to	  impede	  Dutch	  shipping	  and	  commercial	  activities.	  	  Further,	  a	  Dutch	  ruler	  of	  England	  would	  provide	  additional	  opportunities	  for	  Dutch	  merchants.	  	  These	  economic	  considerations	  were	  significant	  in	  the	  United	  Provinces’	  decision	  to	  bankroll	  an	  invasion	  of	  the	  British	  Isles.	  	  	  Dutch	  foreign	  policy	  interests	  supported	  the	  invasion,	  as	  the	  French	  were	  threatening	  Dutch	  trade	  with	  increased	  tariffs	  and	  naval	  aggression.	  	  A	  potential	  Anglo-­‐French	  alliance,	  between	  two	  Catholic	  kings,	  could	  have	  proven	  disastrous	  had	  James	  remained	  king.48	  	  The	  Dutch	  then	  tried	  to	  convince	  the	  English	  that	  the	  French	  were	  their	  true	  enemies.	  	  To	  make	  this	  point	  they	  had	  to	  counter	  decades	  of	  anti-­‐Dutch	  propaganda	  as	  well	  as	  three	  wars	  between	  the	  nations	  to	  bring	  them	  into	  an	  association	  to	  counter	  the	  French.	  	  The	  French	  ambassador	  discounted	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  partnership	  remarking	  at	  the	  time,	  “[t]heir	  [the	  Dutch]	  commerce	  will	  always	  prevent	  their	  coming	  to	  agreement	  with	  the	  English.”49	  	  	  The	  ambassador	  surely	  did	  not	  foresee	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	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  Dutch-­‐supported	  invasion	  of	  Britain	  coupled	  with	  a	  public	  relations	  push	  in	  the	  churches	  to	  reorient	  Britain’s	  foreign	  policy	  goals.	  	  	  William	  was	  able	  to	  convince	  the	  United	  Provinces,	  normally	  suspicious	  of	  the	  political	  agenda	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Orange,	  that	  providing	  him	  an	  army	  to	  invade	  England	  would	  be	  in	  their	  strategic	  interest	  as	  it	  would	  place	  a	  friendly	  ruler	  in	  London.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  merchant	  oligarchs	  of	  the	  Netherlands	  funded	  William’s	  invasion	  of	  England	  “to	  preserve	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  Dutch	  trading	  system	  on	  the	  high	  seas”	  according	  to	  De	  Vries’	  research	  on	  the	  topic.50	  	  These	  merchants	  did	  not	  contradict	  the	  public	  statements	  of	  support	  for	  their	  Protestant	  brothers.	  	  However,	  privately	  they	  knew	  full	  well	  that	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  French,	  they	  needed	  the	  English	  army	  and	  navy	  at	  their	  disposal.51	  	  In	  both	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  England,	  then,	  merchants	  supported	  William’s	  and	  Mary’s	  Glorious	  Revolution	  in	  the	  name	  of	  commerce	  and	  self-­‐interest.	  	  A	  contemporary	  English	  source	  well	  understood	  the	  Dutch	  foreign	  policy	  interests.	  	  He	  expressed	  his	  views	  of	  the	  Dutch	  motives	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  pamphlet	  distributed	  to	  Church	  of	  England	  attendees	  called	  The	  Dutch	  Design	  Anatomized.	  	  The	  author	  is	  simply	  named	  a	  “member	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  England,”	  however,	  modern	  scholarship	  has	  indicated	  that	  one	  of	  King	  James	  II’s	  propagandists	  produced	  it.52	  	  The	  pamphlet	  argues	  that	  the	  Dutch	  were	  motivated	  to	  invade	  “[a]s	  soon	  as	  the	  Prince	  of	  Wales	  was	  Born	  whereby	  the	  crown	  was	  not	  so	  likely	  to	  come	  [to	  William	  or	  Mary].”53	  	  Understanding	  that	  the	  crown	  was	  slipping	  away,	  the	  author	  expressed	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  economic	  motives	  predominated	  as	  “[t]his	  single	  consideration	  was	  powerful	  enough	  to	  invite	  them	  to	  study	  the	  most	  effectual	  means…	  attempt	  something	  against	  the	  king.”54	  “The	  true	  motives,”	  he	  asserts,	  “must	  have	  been	  the	  care	  of	  preserving	  their	  Trade;	  which	  is	  the	  only	  enriching	  of	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  that	  Country.”55	  	  This	  royal	  propagandist	  presented	  England’s	  superior	  economic	  potential	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  Untied	  Provinces.	  	  As	  a	  result	  the	  Dutch	  needed	  to	  protect	  their	  colonial	  and	  trade	  interests	  by	  keeping	  the	  English	  impoverished.	  	  He	  adamantly	  asserted	  that	  the	  change	  of	  regime	  promoted	  Dutch	  interests	  rather	  than	  those	  of	  the	  English.	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  contended,	  the	  Dutch	  not	  only	  intended	  to	  exploit	  the	  English	  economically,	  but	  also	  to	  align	  their	  foreign	  policy	  to	  “oblige	  [England]	  to	  joyn	  with	  them	  against	  France	  [in	  war].”	  He	  claimed	  that	  religion	  and	  political	  philosophy	  are	  being	  invoked	  as	  specious	  rationale	  for	  the	  invasion.	  	  He	  explained,	  “[S]o	  daring	  and	  hazardous	  a	  design,	  required	  some	  colorable	  pretext	  to	  give	  it	  countenance,	  and	  hopes	  of	  success.	  	  Hence	  the	  glorious	  title	  of	  Protector	  of	  the	  Protestant	  Religion,	  and	  Defender	  of	  the	  English	  Liberties.”56	  	  	  He	  thus	  argued	  that	  the	  invasion	  was	  a	  deliberate	  move	  by	  the	  Dutch	  to	  protect	  their	  trade	  and	  advance	  their	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Protecting	  the	  Protestant	  religion	  was	  the	  guise	  William	  assumed	  to	  legitimize	  it.	  	  	  This	  anonymous	  author	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  his	  assessment	  that	  the	  Dutch	  invaded	  due	  to	  economics.	  	  Another	  work,	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Prince	  of	  Orange’s	  Declaration,	  also	  discredited	  the	  official	  view	  that	  religion	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  invasion.	  	  Its	  author,	  too,	  cited	  economics	  and	  political	  self-­‐interest	  in	  preserving	  their	  trade	  for	  the	  invasion.57	  	  	  The	  economic	  and	  political	  motives	  have	  largely	  been	  overlooked	  in	  the	  centuries	  of	  writings	  about	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution.	  	  The	  religious	  argument	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  large	  part	  at	  its	  face	  value.	  	  Political	  arguments	  have	  sometimes	  been	  considered	  as	  propelling	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  but	  economic	  ones	  have	  been	  rarely	  considered	  significant.	  	  It	  is	  especially	  interesting	  that	  both	  participants	  in	  the	  events	  and	  polemicists	  arguing	  against	  them	  acknowledged	  that	  economics	  were	  the	  primary	  concern.	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  William	  of	  Orange	  and	  his	  army	  invaded	  England	  in	  late	  1688	  and,	  in	  a	  relatively	  bloodless	  invasion,	  quickly	  took	  power	  of	  the	  country.	  	  James	  II	  fled	  to	  France	  and	  took	  with	  him	  both	  the	  specter	  of	  a	  Catholic	  monarchy	  and	  the	  outdated	  and	  ineffective	  economic	  policies	  of	  the	  Stuart	  kings.	  	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  Glorious	  Revolution	  brought	  a	  new	  spirit	  of	  tolerance	  and	  openness	  across	  the	  English	  Channel,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  economic	  ideas	  that	  had	  made	  the	  Netherlands	  the	  global	  commercial	  leader.	  	  For	  the	  Immortal	  Seven,	  it	  was	  these	  economic	  ideas	  that	  truly	  motivated	  them	  into	  action.	  	  The	  implementation	  of	  these	  economic	  policies	  brought	  about	  an	  English	  Financial	  Revolution,	  just	  as	  they	  had	  hoped.	  	  	  	  
Part	  II:	  	   William’s	  “Financial	  Revolution”	  
The	  Glorious	  Revolution	  is	  often	  praised	  for	  the	  inauguration	  of	  greater	  tolerance,	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  Protestant	  king	  in	  England,	  and	  promulgation	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  but	  the	  greatest	  change	  was	  the	  financial	  reform	  initiated	  by	  William	  in	  his	  first	  ten	  years	  as	  king	  of	  England.	  As	  king,	  William	  resolved	  the	  issues	  that	  were	  holding	  back	  the	  English	  economy.	  	  He	  instituted	  policies	  friendly	  to	  merchant	  interests	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  national	  debt,	  and	  resolution	  of	  the	  Currency	  Crisis,	  which	  had	  impeded	  commerce	  through	  a	  lack	  of	  specie.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  crown	  began	  to	  assertively	  advocate	  for	  English	  commercial	  interests	  and	  broke	  up	  the	  large	  state-­‐sponsored	  enterprises,	  which	  advanced	  the	  emerging	  New	  London	  Merchants.	  These	  changes	  to	  the	  monetary	  and	  banking	  systems	  led	  to	  a	  burgeoning	  self-­‐conscious	  class	  whose	  earnings	  were	  based	  on	  the	  developing	  financial	  and	  banking	  sector.	  	  These	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  are	  significant	  because	  they	  allowed	  Britain	  to	  become	  to	  world’s	  leading	  economy	  and	  largest	  imperial	  power	  in	  the	  modern	  era.	  	  So	  much	  so	  that	  some	  have	  deemed	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  along	  with	  the	  changes	  to	  currency	  and	  emergence	  of	  a	  financial	  sector	  as	  a	  “Financial	  Revolution.”	  	  
	  
London	  was	  poised	  for	  success,	  even	  with	  poor	  leadership	  from	  the	  Stuart	  kings,	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  inherent	  factors	  that	  put	  it	  in	  a	  great	  position	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  global	  commerce	  in	  the	  future.	  	  As	  a	  foundation	  for	  its	  future	  success	  under	  William,	  London	  had	  a	  population	  twice	  that	  of	  Amsterdam,	  merchants	  that	  invested	  primarily	  in	  local	  manufacturing,	  and	  a	  London-­‐centric	  economy.	  	  The	  Netherlands’	  markets	  were,	  by	  contrast,	  more	  decentralized.	  	  Demonstrating	  that	  decentralization,	  customs	  receipts	  in	  Amsterdam	  in	  1698	  made	  up	  roughly	  51%	  of	  the	  Dutch	  total,	  while	  those	  in	  London	  made	  up	  82%	  of	  the	  national	  total.	  	  Lower	  taxes	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  change	  of	  fortunes.	  	  As	  David	  Ormrod	  has	  noted:	  “the	  political	  and	  financial	  resources	  approached	  [their]	  natural	  ‘tax	  ceiling”	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  “[t]he	  tax	  burden	  (tax	  revenue	  per	  capita)	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  in	  Britain,	  being	  almost	  twice	  as	  high.”58	  	  Thus,	  once	  unchained	  from	  an	  archaic	  banking	  system	  and	  released	  from	  a	  crucial	  shortage	  of	  currency,	  through	  William’s	  policy	  innovations,	  London	  would	  be	  poised	  to	  capitalize	  on	  its	  advantages	  of	  low	  taxes,	  a	  large	  population,	  and	  a	  London-­‐centric	  economy	  to	  do	  business.	  	  These	  factors	  lay	  a	  powerful	  foundation	  for	  London’s	  future	  success.	  	  	  
But	  despite	  his	  relatively	  bloodless	  invasion,	  the	  implementation	  of	  William’s	  financial	  policies	  was	  not	  achieved	  without	  resistance.	  	  All	  of	  his	  actions	  took	  on	  a	  political	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  life	  of	  their	  own,	  and	  many	  were	  actively	  debated	  in	  the	  public	  discourse	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Parliament.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  discussions	  and	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Financial	  Revolution	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  change	  William	  truly	  brought	  to	  England.	  	  
	  
Part	  II.A.:	  	   Bank	  of	  England,	  National	  Debt,	  and	  a	  Fiscal-­Military	  State	  Almost	  immediately	  after	  taking	  power	  William	  took	  Britain	  in	  to	  a	  war	  with	  France.	  	  This	  war,	  along	  with	  many	  of	  his	  future	  conflicts,	  was	  costly	  and	  greatly	  increased	  government	  spending.	  	  In	  order	  to	  finance	  these	  wars,	  a	  modernization	  of	  the	  economy	  was	  necessary.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  national	  debt,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  and	  emergence	  of	  a	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  allowed	  both	  the	  economic	  modernization	  William’s	  supporters	  had	  wanted	  as	  well	  as	  the	  military	  strength	  and	  preparation	  a	  war	  demanded.	  	  	  
As	  the	  English	  polemicists	  at	  the	  time	  of	  William’s	  invasion	  had	  accurately	  predicted,	  part	  of	  William’s	  motivation	  for	  invading	  England	  was	  to	  involve	  it	  in	  wars	  with	  France	  to	  protect	  Holland.	  	  To	  do	  so,	  he	  quickly	  ran	  up	  large	  deficits	  for	  the	  English.	  In	  the	  first	  twelve	  years	  of	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  rule	  in	  England,	  military	  costs	  tripled	  from	  £2	  million	  per	  year	  to	  	  £6	  million.59	  	  In	  the	  Netherlands	  where	  they	  had	  previously	  ruled,	  critics	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  “the	  secret	  of	  running	  the	  state	  over	  head	  and	  ears	  in	  debt”	  which	  was	  necessary	  in	  their	  circumstances.60	  King	  William	  III	  was	  hard	  pressed	  to	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  finance	  the	  war	  without	  drastically	  increasing	  taxes	  on	  landowners.	  61	  To	  avoid	  doing	  so,	  he	  created	  new	  financial	  institutions.	  	  He	  inaugurated	  public	  borrowing,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  Bank	  of	  England.	  	  
Angle	  26	  Contemporary	  treasury	  and	  mint	  data	  offer	  compelling	  evidence	  the	  enormous	  shortfalls	  England	  faced	  between	  1689	  and	  1697:	  these	  shortfalls	  made	  the	  drastic	  fiscal	  changes	  necessary.	  	  First,	  William	  nearly	  quintupled	  spending	  in	  his	  first	  ten	  years.	  	  This	  massive	  spending	  required	  the	  creation	  of	  England’s	  first	  substantial	  national	  debt.	  	  During	  his	  first	  ten	  years	  as	  king,	  the	  debt	  grew	  from	  almost	  nothing	  to	  nearly	  17.5	  million	  pounds;	  the	  portion	  financed	  by	  long-­‐term	  bank	  notes	  grew	  from	  zero	  to	  roughly	  thirty	  percent.62	  Long-­‐term	  debt	  was	  a	  particularly	  attractive	  way	  to	  finance	  large	  government	  expenditures	  because	  it	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  spend	  money	  immediately	  on	  the	  military	  but	  simply	  pay	  a	  small	  amount	  in	  interest	  to	  bondholders.63	  	  This	  allowed	  their	  cash	  supplies	  to	  grow	  	  	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  calculation	  especially	  important	  in	  the	  mercantilist	  system.	  (Mercantilism	  was	  the	  economic	  system	  most	  prevalent	  in	  this	  period.	  Mercantilism	  emphasized	  a	  nation’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  and	  its	  holding	  of	  gold	  and	  silver	  bullion	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  national	  strength.)	  These	  long-­‐term	  notes	  were	  crucial	  in	  curtailing	  the	  significant	  monetary	  constriction	  which	  had	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  both	  an	  unfavorable	  balance-­‐of-­‐payments	  produced	  by	  disruption	  of	  war	  and	  the	  ongoing	  Currency	  Crisis.	  	  These	  were	  all	  sharp	  shifts	  in	  England’s	  fiscal	  policy,	  which	  were	  necessitated	  by	  William’s	  policies	  but	  also	  inaugurated	  by	  him	  to	  address	  his	  own	  “fiscal	  cliff.”	  	  	  
Prior	  to	  1688,	  the	  Crown	  borrowed	  relatively	  little	  on	  either	  a	  short	  or	  long-­‐term	  basis.64	  Private	  lenders	  and	  foreigners	  who	  made	  loans	  generally	  did	  not	  distinguish	  between	  short	  and	  long-­‐term	  borrowing.	  	  Their	  demands	  for	  payments	  at	  irregular	  times	  caused	  P.G.M.	  Dickson	  –	  the	  forefather	  of	  this	  field	  of	  history	  and	  creator	  of	  the	  term	  Financial	  Revolution	  –	  to	  call	  it	  a	  “growing	  snowball	  of	  debt,”	  with	  the	  government	  careening	  from	  one	  short-­‐term	  payment	  to	  another.	  Due	  to	  high	  interest	  rates	  on	  the	  short-­‐
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  term	  borrowing,	  the	  government	  frequently	  had	  to	  repay	  loans	  in	  crown	  lands.	  For	  example,	  previously	  they	  had	  to	  sell	  a	  number	  of	  estates	  in	  Ireland	  to	  creditors	  due	  to	  early	  redemption	  of	  loans.65	  	  This	  practice	  was	  unsustainable	  and	  unhealthy	  to	  the	  government’s	  finances.	  	  	  
But	  Dutch	  practice	  suggested	  a	  different	  model	  than	  frenetic	  short-­‐term	  sales:	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  William	  had	  previously	  allowed	  individuals	  to	  purchase	  insurance	  policies	  or	  annuities	  from	  the	  government	  to	  finance	  large	  loan	  sales.66	  	  These	  sales,	  with	  fixed	  terms	  and	  interest	  rates,	  gave	  the	  government	  more	  certainty	  in	  borrowing	  and	  were	  soon	  implemented	  in	  Britain.	  William	  III	  employed	  creative	  strategies	  to	  raise	  revenues,	  including	  the	  Million	  Lottery	  of	  1694	  which	  sold	  140,000	  tickets	  of	  	  £10	  each.67	  	  The	  lottery	  did	  raise	  some	  money,	  but	  failed	  to	  reach	  its	  goals	  and	  was	  generally	  considered	  a	  failure.	  Its	  failure,	  however,	  indirectly	  led	  to	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  only	  a	  year	  later.	  	  
The	  development	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	  intended	  to	  dramatically	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  borrowing	  by	  issuing	  government	  bonds.	  	  While	  this	  development	  is	  retrospectively	  seen	  as	  an	  unquestionably	  positive	  economic	  development,	  at	  the	  time,	  its	  creation	  involved	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  debate	  and	  criticism.	  	  Immediately	  following	  the	  revolution,	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  was	  politically	  charged.	  	  It	  divided	  the	  Parliament	  and	  hamstrung	  William’s	  efforts.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  establishment,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  it	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
Although	  to	  modern	  observers	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  national	  debt	  appears	  unquestionably	  positive,	  to	  contemporary	  polemicists	  the	  development	  was	  controversial	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  and	  worrisome.	  	  A	  series	  of	  essays	  “On	  the	  Public	  Debt,”	  “On	  Paper-­‐Money,	  Banking,	  etc,”	  and	  “On	  Frugality”	  are	  most	  commonly	  attributed	  to	  Earl	  Alexander	  Montgomerie	  of	  Edington.	  	  The	  essays	  take	  a	  historical	  look	  at	  the	  issues	  of	  public	  debt,	  paper	  money	  and	  the	  financial	  sector’s	  role;	  they	  also	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  frugality.	  	  Montgomerie	  objected	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  while	  the	  public	  debt	  was	  owed	  by	  all	  the	  inhabitants,	  the	  profits	  only	  went	  to	  a	  few	  people	  –	  who	  were	  deemed	  “bloodsuckers”	  by	  the	  Earl.68	  	  He	  believed	  that	  the	  debt	  was	  unnatural	  and	  that	  it	  “[was]	  an	  absolute	  alienation.”69	  	  According	  to	  Montgomerie,	  the	  public	  debt	  emerged	  from	  King	  William’s	  War;	  it	  “involved	  this	  nation	  in	  an	  expense	  unknown	  till	  then”	  and	  new	  “inventions”	  were	  needed	  to	  finance	  it.	  	  Profits	  of	  thirty	  to	  forty	  percent	  were	  made	  off	  debt	  sold	  during	  the	  Nine	  Years	  War	  from	  1688	  to	  1697.	  	  The	  earl	  considered	  individuals	  profiting	  off	  of	  peacetime	  debt	  particularly	  distressing.70	  	  He	  framed	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  debt	  primarily	  in	  moral	  terms	  and	  hoped	  to	  abolish	  it	  eventually.	  	  Like	  the	  propagandist	  during	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  who	  predicted	  that	  William	  would	  lead	  England	  into	  many	  wars,	  this	  later	  critic	  too	  saw	  William’s	  many	  wars	  as	  financed	  because	  many	  people	  were	  making	  money	  off	  of	  buying	  the	  new	  government	  bonds	  and	  securities.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  were	  war	  profiteers.	  	  
However,	  there	  were	  strong	  supporters	  of	  public	  financing	  of	  the	  national	  debt	  as	  well.	  	  In	  a	  pamphlet	  distributed	  to	  the	  Houses	  of	  Lords	  and	  Commons,	  John	  Briscoe	  vigorously	  supported	  the	  creation	  of	  “publik	  credit,”	  now	  known	  as	  national	  debt,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  money	  supply	  through	  paper	  specie.	  	  Briscoe’s	  pamphlet,	  written	  in	  1694,	  advocated	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  He	  geared	  his	  arguments	  towards	  the	  upper	  class	  that	  would	  be	  reading	  his	  pamphlet.71	  	  According	  to	  his	  pamphlet,	  the	  acts	  considered	  by	  Parliament	  in	  1694	  allowed	  the	  selling	  of	  government	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  “Bills	  of	  Credit”	  to	  people	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  government	  spending	  greater	  than	  the	  regular	  revenue	  intake.	  	  To	  encourage	  their	  purchase,	  interest	  was	  given	  on	  the	  annuities	  and	  landowners	  were	  allowed	  to	  deduct	  the	  annuities	  from	  their	  tax	  bill	  to	  the	  state.	  These	  annuities	  would	  pay	  a	  regular	  coupon	  based	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bill	  and	  an	  interest	  rate	  ranging	  from	  2.1	  to	  13.1%	  per	  year,	  depending	  on	  the	  term	  of	  the	  bill.72	  	  
Briscoe,	  a	  member	  of	  Parliament,	  asserted	  that	  the	  sale	  of	  “Bills	  of	  Credit”	  would	  “unite	  [people’s]	  Majesties	  and	  the	  People	  in	  each	  others	  interest”	  and	  would	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  money	  available	  for	  trade	  and	  investment.	  	  The	  credit,	  according	  to	  Briscoe,	  would	  also	  “bring	  new	  manufacturers	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  that	  cannot	  now	  be	  wrought	  here	  by	  reason	  of	  high	  interest,	  and	  set	  many	  thousands	  to	  work…	  by	  [easing]	  all	  the	  Nobility	  and	  Gentry	  from	  Taxes.”73	  	  Appealing	  to	  the	  landed	  gentry,	  he	  asserted	  (although	  he	  did	  not	  specify	  how)	  that	  “Bills	  of	  Credit”	  would	  raise	  the	  value	  of	  land	  and	  allow	  inheritance	  of	  assets	  other	  than	  land.74	  	  All	  of	  these	  financial	  limitations	  or	  concerns	  could	  be,	  in	  his	  view,	  redressed	  through	  acceptance	  of	  a	  public	  debt.	  	  	  
Briscoe’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  issue	  was	  more	  analytical	  and	  systematic	  than	  that	  of	  many	  of	  his	  contemporaries.	  	  He	  understood	  that	  merchants	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  have	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  to	  carry	  out	  trade.	  	  He	  also	  accurately	  predicted	  that	  bills	  of	  credit	  would	  allow	  for	  greater	  investment	  in	  manufacturing.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  concerns	  of	  his	  critics	  who	  were	  afraid	  that	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  would	  end	  up	  with	  control	  over	  the	  money	  were	  also	  ultimately	  accurate,	  despite	  Briscoe’s	  assertion	  that	  it	  would	  only	  control	  certain	  aspects	  of	  money.	  	  But	  too	  his	  arguments	  would	  have	  been	  well	  received	  by	  the	  landowning	  gentry	  and	  lords	  before	  whom	  he	  made	  them	  because	  the	  creation	  of	  national	  debt	  through	  bills	  of	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  credit	  reduced	  pressure	  on	  Parliament	  to	  raise	  taxes.	  	  Moreover,	  their	  purchase	  of	  the	  bills	  allowed	  them	  to	  reduce	  their	  tax	  liability.	  	  
In	  1694,	  when	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  received	  its	  charter	  from	  Parliament,	  it	  was	  charged	  to	  supply	  a	  national	  debt	  but	  with	  specific	  restrictions	  on	  its	  lending.	  	  Its	  first	  leader,	  Michael	  Godfrey	  created	  the	  plans	  for	  the	  bank	  in	  1693.	  	  It	  was	  chartered	  to	  float	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  annuities	  that	  the	  Dutch	  central	  bank	  had	  sold	  to	  raise	  revenue.75	  	  In	  The	  Bank	  
of	  England	  Act,	  1694,	  the	  bank	  received	  a	  royal	  commission	  to	  “[deal]	  in	  Bills	  of	  Exchange,	  or	  in	  buying	  or	  selling	  Bullion,	  Gold	  or	  Silver,	  or	  in	  selling	  any	  Goods,	  Wares	  or	  Merchandize	  whatsoever,	  which	  shall	  really	  and	  bona	  fide	  by	  left	  or	  deposited	  with	  the	  said	  Corporation	  for	  Money	  lent	  and	  advanced	  thereon.”76	  	  It	  was	  explicitly	  prohibited,	  however,	  “to	  deal	  or	  trade	  with	  any	  of	  the	  Stock	  Moneys…	  belonging	  to	  the	  said	  Corporation,	  in	  the	  buying	  or	  selling	  of	  any	  Goods,	  Wares,	  or	  Merchandizes.”77	  Thus	  its	  charter	  explicitly	  granted	  the	  bank	  permission	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  banking	  transaction	  it	  wanted	  –	  bypassing	  many	  of	  the	  contemporary	  rules	  on	  banks	  –	  while	  protecting	  the	  merchants	  from	  a	  monopolistic	  competitor	  in	  trade.	  	  A	  lithograph	  of	  the	  charter	  signing	  depicts	  John	  Somers,	  representing	  the	  Crown	  as	  Lord	  Keeper,	  signing	  the	  charter	  and	  Houblon	  and	  Godfrey,	  who	  wrote	  the	  plans,	  as	  the	  Governor	  and	  Deputy	  Governors	  respectively	  of	  the	  bank.78	  	  The	  bank	  obtained	  its	  initial	  cohort	  of	  deposits	  from	  subscribers	  to	  the	  bank	  who	  raised	  	  £1,200,000	  in	  only	  ten	  days.79	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	  born:	  it	  immediately	  began	  loaning	  to	  the	  English	  government	  at	  favorable	  terms	  and	  offering	  a	  safe	  investment	  for	  British	  people	  and	  businesses.	  	  
The	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  bank’s	  history,	  from	  1694	  to	  1704,	  were	  marked	  by	  both	  challenges	  and	  bright	  prospects.	  	  In	  its	  first	  few	  years,	  it	  had	  difficulty	  separating	  short	  and	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  long-­‐term	  loans	  and	  finding	  appropriate	  loan	  terms;	  they	  had	  to	  give	  financial	  incentives	  to	  extend	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  loans.80	  	  That	  said,	  within	  only	  a	  few	  years	  a	  national	  bank	  had	  been	  established	  with	  quality	  management	  that	  earned	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  and	  foreign	  creditors.81	  As	  the	  bank	  grew	  larger	  it	  displaced	  the	  goldsmith-­‐bankers	  as	  the	  safest	  place	  to	  save	  gold,	  and	  it	  began	  serving	  as	  a	  “banker’s	  bank,”	  supplying	  money	  and	  credit	  to	  them	  all.82	  	  This	  shift	  away	  from	  dozens	  of	  small	  independent	  goldsmith-­‐bankers	  to	  a	  national	  bankers	  bank	  is	  an	  important	  development.	  	  It	  led	  the	  way	  to	  modern-­‐day	  central	  banks	  controlling	  currency	  and	  lending	  money	  to	  commercial	  banks.	  	  	  
Another	  significant	  development	  associated	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	  that	  “Parliament	  guaranteed	  all	  these	  loans	  and	  made	  them	  ‘debts	  of	  the	  nation	  or	  ‘national	  debts’”	  which	  signaled	  an	  important	  shift	  to	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  customers	  of	  the	  bank.	  This	  shift	  to	  a	  national	  debt	  evidences	  a	  change	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  governing	  away	  from	  a	  separate	  king	  and	  state	  to	  one	  where	  the	  king	  and	  the	  nation’s	  finances	  were	  one	  in	  the	  same.83	  	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  national	  debt,	  owed	  and	  owned	  by	  all,	  created	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  how	  government	  was	  run.	  In	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  Bank’s	  foundation	  in	  1694,	  Britain	  averaged	  between	  31.1	  and	  39.9%	  of	  its	  budget	  raised	  from	  loans.84	  	  These	  substantial	  deficits	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  government	  by	  allowing	  it	  to	  build	  up	  a	  much	  larger	  military	  than	  tax	  revenues	  alone	  would	  have	  previously	  allowed.	  	  	  
This	  change	  in	  government	  correlates	  directly	  to	  the	  theories	  Locke	  presented.	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  king	  arbitrarily	  borrowing	  without	  his	  subjects’	  consent,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	  created	  by	  Parliament	  with	  its	  securities	  purchased	  by	  common	  people.	  	  No	  longer	  were	  the	  nation’s	  finances	  only	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  king,	  but	  rather	  each	  citizen	  had	  a	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  stake	  in	  them	  and	  could	  purchase	  their	  share	  of	  the	  country’s	  future	  through	  the	  bonds.	  	  	  Each	  purchase	  of	  a	  bond	  or	  security	  served	  as	  sort	  of	  renewal	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  governors	  and	  governed	  and	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  English	  prosperity.	  	  	  	  	  
Like	  the	  Dutch	  Wisselbank,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  created	  investment	  securities	  that	  encouraged	  saving	  and	  investing,	  and	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  modern	  banking.	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  began	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  securities	  in	  which	  mercantile	  and	  financial	  houses	  could	  safely	  invest,	  and	  from	  which	  they	  could	  easily	  divest.	  	  Some	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  without	  these	  facilities,	  the	  City’s	  complex	  structure	  could	  not	  have	  been	  built	  up	  and	  the	  course	  of	  European	  history	  would	  have	  changed	  as	  a	  result.85	  	  While	  this	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  overstatement,	  this	  development	  furthered	  British	  economic	  development	  beyond	  its	  earlier	  constraints.	  	  It	  took	  the	  economy	  into	  the	  modern	  era	  of	  banking	  and	  finance	  beyond	  simple	  lending.	  	  Stable	  financial	  products	  like	  government	  bonds	  form	  the	  bedrock	  of	  financial	  services	  and	  investments	  because	  of	  their	  predictable	  yields.	  	  Without	  them,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  advanced	  banking	  sector;	  England’s	  vibrant	  financial	  services	  sector	  today	  is,	  in	  fact,	  based	  entirely	  on	  this	  development.	  	  
Of	  the	  sixty-­‐six	  years	  following	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  the	  nation	  found	  itself	  at	  war	  twenty-­‐nine	  of	  them.86	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  provided	  for	  the	  enormous	  spending	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  fight	  Louis	  XIV	  and	  others.	  	  Sufficient	  funds	  for	  this	  massive	  war	  effort	  could	  not	  have	  occurred	  had	  the	  traditional	  banking	  arrangements,	  which	  characterized	  England	  before	  William’s	  reforms,	  such	  as	  the	  goldsmith	  bankers,	  remained	  in	  place.	  	  Under	  William,	  large	  debts	  allowed	  Britain	  to	  fight	  its	  frequent	  wars	  against	  Louis	  XIV	  and	  others	  because,	  unlike	  Louis	  and	  other	  rivals	  with	  more	  traditional	  financing	  structures,	  the	  British	  national	  debt	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  immediately	  serviced.87	  	  Benefits,	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  such	  as	  prompt	  payment	  of	  soldiers	  and	  the	  building	  of	  ships,	  could	  be	  realized	  immediately	  while	  costs	  and	  interest	  were	  deferred	  and	  paid	  down	  the	  road.	  	  After	  its	  creation,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  served	  as	  the	  “financial	  counterpart	  in	  the	  Protestant	  coalition	  of	  the	  armies	  raised	  from	  among	  English,	  Dutch,	  Flemish,	  French	  and	  Swiss	  Protestants”	  against	  the	  Catholic	  armies	  of	  Louis	  XIV,	  according	  to	  the	  Financial	  Revolution’s	  most	  significant	  historian,	  P.G.M.	  Dickson.88	  	  Without	  its	  financing	  of	  long-­‐term	  debt,	  the	  English	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  support	  their	  Protestant	  brothers	  in	  European	  theatres	  of	  war.	  	  
Thus,	  in	  William’s	  first	  few	  years	  in	  England,	  he	  made	  great	  strides	  towards	  modernizing	  their	  backwards	  economy.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  national	  debt	  and	  national	  bank	  on	  the	  model	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Amsterdam	  were	  some	  of	  the	  reforms	  that	  English	  merchants	  had	  wanted	  to	  see	  imported	  from	  the	  Low	  Countries.	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  financial	  products	  also	  allowed	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  more	  modern	  banking	  sector	  with	  advanced	  financial	  products	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  those	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  government	  fundamentally	  reoriented	  itself	  to	  one	  focused	  on	  protecting	  property	  along	  a	  Lockean	  model.	  	  The	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  William	  created	  was	  able	  to	  fight	  global	  wars,	  grow	  the	  English	  empire	  around	  the	  globe,	  and	  support	  a	  growing	  economy.	  	  William’s	  Financial	  Revolution	  was	  not	  complete,	  however.	  	  Had	  he	  failed	  to	  resolve	  the	  Currency	  Crisis,	  none	  of	  his	  efforts	  would	  have	  been	  effective	  beyond	  the	  very	  short	  run.	  	  In	  order	  to	  bring	  long-­‐term	  economic	  success	  to	  England,	  William	  would	  have	  to	  reform	  the	  currency.	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Part	  II.B.i:	  Currency	  Crisis	  As	  a	  significant	  an	  advance	  as	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  may	  have	  been,	  however,	  without	  reforming	  the	  currency	  markets	  –	  the	  lifeblood	  of	  an	  economy	  –	  further	  progress	  could	  not	  be	  attained.	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  Britain	  had	  a	  decades-­‐long	  crisis	  over	  a	  lack	  of	  hard	  currency	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  	  Shipping	  gold	  and	  silver	  bullion	  abroad	  to	  settle	  large	  trade	  deficits	  led	  to	  fewer	  coins	  circulating	  domestically.	  	  In	  order	  to	  have	  enough	  coins	  even	  to	  carry	  out	  transactions,	  coins	  were	  cut	  down,	  or	  “clipped,”	  to	  fit	  the	  value	  of	  the	  transaction.	  	  For	  instance,	  imagine	  today	  if	  there	  were	  not	  enough	  money	  for	  a	  grocer	  to	  even	  sell	  apples	  to	  a	  customer.	  	  In	  an	  era	  of	  clipping	  the	  grocer	  would	  take	  the	  patron’s	  silver	  dollar	  and	  shave	  off	  some	  of	  the	  dollar,	  and	  then	  use	  the	  value	  of	  that	  shaved	  silver	  as	  the	  currency.	  Obviously	  the	  long-­‐term	  effect	  of	  this	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  damper	  on	  commerce.	  	  The	  resolution	  of	  this	  problem	  is	  so	  significant,	  so	  controversial,	  and	  took	  so	  much	  effort	  on	  William’s	  part	  that	  it	  merits	  particular	  attention	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  Without	  resolving	  the	  issues	  associated	  with	  currency,	  none	  of	  William’s	  other	  financial	  reforms	  would	  have	  taken	  hold	  or	  been	  as	  effective	  in	  creating	  a	  modern	  economy.	  	  	  
To	  understand	  how	  a	  wealthy	  nation	  like	  Britain	  found	  itself	  in	  such	  a	  primitive	  and	  limiting	  situation	  with	  its	  currency,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  study	  the	  background	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  Due	  to	  their	  involvement	  in	  continental	  wars,	  England’s	  balance-­‐of-­‐payments,	  or	  trade	  deficit,	  drained	  them	  of	  silver	  and	  gold	  bullion.	  	  Coins	  were	  then	  melted	  down	  and	  shipped	  out	  of	  the	  country	  to	  settle	  these	  payments.	  	  This	  led	  to	  a	  scarcity	  of	  coins	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  greatly	  impeded	  the	  conduct	  of	  commercial	  transactions.	  	  There	  was	  literally	  not	  enough	  money	  flowing	  through	  the	  economy	  to	  carry	  out	  business.	  	  As	  a	  stopgap,	  people	  “clipped”	  their	  coins	  down	  into	  smaller	  amounts,	  based	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  metal	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  content	  coins	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  daily	  transactions.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  man	  was	  buying	  wool	  from	  a	  merchant,	  and	  he	  only	  had	  one	  gold	  guinea	  he	  could	  weigh	  the	  coin,	  cut	  off	  enough	  of	  the	  coin’s	  weight	  to	  equal	  the	  value	  of	  the	  transaction,	  and	  pay	  the	  person	  with	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  coin.	  	  This	  was	  a	  significant	  problem	  in	  contemporary	  England,	  and	  it	  affected	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy.	  To	  resolve	  this	  overriding	  issue	  –	  more	  significant	  than	  either	  their	  lack	  of	  banking	  sector	  or	  national	  debt	  –	  William	  adopted	  a	  currency	  model	  based	  on	  his	  experiences	  in	  Holland.	  	  
William	  changed	  the	  English	  monetary	  system	  by	  deploying	  two	  strategies.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  William’s	  solution	  involved	  a	  highly	  disruptive	  “great	  recoinage”	  of	  all	  of	  the	  coins	  circulating	  throughout	  England.89	  	  The	  other	  part	  of	  his	  solution	  to	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  involved	  the	  nascent	  Bank	  of	  England.	  	  To	  provide	  greater	  liquidity	  in	  the	  currency	  market	  without	  additional	  gold	  or	  silver	  bullion,	  William	  began	  to	  push	  the	  use	  of	  paper	  money.	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  began	  issuing	  its	  own	  paper	  notes	  for	  the	  internal	  market,	  and	  these	  paper	  notes	  slowly	  emerged	  as	  the	  national	  standard.	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  success	  in	  their	  push	  for	  paper	  specie	  compared	  to	  previous	  efforts	  can	  perhaps	  be	  attributed	  to	  its	  greater	  scope	  and	  authority	  than	  goldsmith-­‐merchants	  and	  the	  increased	  severity	  of	  the	  Currency	  Crisis.	  	  Taken	  together	  these	  resolved	  both	  the	  problems	  of	  worthless	  clipped	  coins	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  currency	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  currency	  in	  England	  had	  led	  to	  the	  clipping,	  so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  root	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  England	  found	  itself	  shifting	  monetarily,	  but	  also	  philosophically.	  	  Coins	  no	  longer	  represented	  a	  value	  of	  silver,	  but	  rather	  changed	  to	  represent	  a	  greater	  faith	  in	  a	  government	  stating	  the	  worth	  of	  a	  coin.	  	  In	  the	  1690s	  it	  was	  cheaper	  to	  buy	  silver	  bullion	  than	  mint	  silver	  coins,	  so	  the	  English	  began	  converting	  their	  existing	  coins	  to	  silver	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  bullion.	  John	  Briscoe	  claimed,	  at	  that	  time,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  nation’s	  money	  was	  being	  taken	  abroad	  in	  the	  form	  of	  bullion	  for	  debt	  payments	  and	  currency	  transactions.90	  	  These	  deficits	  had	  to	  be	  settled	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  silver	  bullion	  and	  bills.	  	  Coins	  circulating	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  were	  stripped	  of	  up	  to	  forty	  percent	  of	  their	  metal	  content	  to	  assist	  in	  settling	  the	  deficits.91	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  “great	  recoinage,”	  the	  government	  then	  mixed	  silver	  with	  other	  metals	  to	  create	  less	  valuable	  coins	  with	  the	  same	  stated	  value.	  92	  	  This	  development	  was	  controversial	  at	  the	  time	  as	  the	  coins	  then	  had	  less	  value	  in	  silver	  but	  the	  same	  stated	  market	  value.	  	  A	  modern	  day	  example	  would	  be	  a	  nickel	  being	  worth	  5¢	  in	  silver,	  the	  price	  of	  silver	  declining	  and	  making	  the	  coin	  worth	  only	  3¢,	  but	  still	  calling	  the	  coin	  a	  nickel.	  	  Philosopher	  John	  Locke	  understood	  these	  developments,	  however,	  and	  wrote	  “the	  intrinsick	  value	  of	  silver	  [being]	  the	  true	  instrument	  and	  measure	  of	  commerce,	  is	  partly	  true	  and	  partly	  false;	  for	  the	  money	  of	  every	  country	  not	  the	  ounce	  of	  silver…	  [correlates]	  to	  its	  denomination	  and	  the	  standard	  of	  the	  coin	  of	  each	  nation’s	  is	  very	  different.”93	  	  This	  devaluation	  of	  the	  coins	  away	  from	  their	  intrinsic	  value	  reflected	  Locke’s	  statement	  that	  each	  nation’s	  standards	  were	  different	  and	  began	  a	  movement	  towards	  the	  value	  of	  metal	  in	  the	  coin	  not	  equaling	  its	  denomination.	  	  To	  Locke,	  the	  coin	  represented	  what	  the	  government	  said	  it	  did,	  not	  what	  a	  goldsmith	  said	  its	  weight	  in	  precious	  metals	  was.	  	  This	  reflects	  the	  Lockean	  views	  about	  government	  and	  the	  place	  of	  governance	  in	  society	  as	  well.	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Part	  II.B.ii.	  :	  	   Debate	  Surrounding	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  	   With	  changes	  as	  enormous	  as	  a	  national	  recoinage	  and	  a	  push	  for	  paper	  money,	  it	  was	  only	  natural	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  debate	  would	  ensue	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  As	  William	  had	  only	  recently	  taken	  the	  throne,	  many	  of	  the	  developments	  he	  promoted	  were	  all	  the	  more	  controversial;	  having	  a	  foreigner	  come	  and	  change	  the	  monetary	  system	  is	  quite	  radical.	  	  The	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  is	  also	  important	  to	  study	  both	  in	  the	  context	  of	  William’s	  reign	  as	  well	  as	  of	  future	  developments	  in	  currency	  and	  money.	  	  Four	  contemporary	  sources	  are	  particularly	  revealing	  and	  important	  to	  analyze	  for	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  debate.	  	  The	  authors	  include	  a	  man	  known	  today	  as	  “An	  English	  Merchant,”	  Henry	  Layton,	  Clement	  Simon,	  and	  A.	  Vickaris,	  all	  of	  whom	  wrote	  widely-­‐read	  pamphlets	  –	  some	  even	  distributed	  to	  people	  leaving	  church	  –	  that	  attempted	  to	  influence	  the	  discourse	  and	  debate	  of	  the	  time	  over	  William’s	  radical	  solutions	  to	  the	  Currency	  Crisis.	  	  Whether	  they	  named	  him,	  all	  of	  these	  authors	  addressed	  William’s	  reforms	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  as	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  was	  the	  hot	  topic	  of	  that	  time.	  	  These	  reforms	  were	  his	  project	  and	  focus,	  as	  without	  them	  his	  reign	  could	  have	  come	  to	  an	  early	  close	  and	  certainly	  would	  not	  have	  been	  as	  significant.	  	  The	  first	  attack	  in	  this	  debate	  came	  from	  an	  Englishman	  living	  abroad	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  debate	  who	  weighed	  in	  with	  “A	  Letter	  From	  An	  English	  Merchant	  at	  Amsterdam	  to	  his	  Friend	  at	  London”	  regarding	  the	  perils	  of	  the	  change	  in	  the	  silver	  and	  gold	  currency.	  	  The	  author,	  who	  remains	  unnamed	  still	  today,	  began	  by	  asserting	  that	  a	  slippery	  slope	  starts	  by	  “[c]lipping	  [money]	  by	  degrees	  three	  or	  four	  times	  over,	  till	  at	  last	  its	  come	  to	  this,	  that	  it	  can	  hardly	  be	  clipt	  any	  longer.”94	  	  An	  educated	  reader	  knows,	  of	  course,	  that	  his	  argument	  that	  the	  English	  are	  on	  a	  slippery	  slope	  is	  a	  fallacious	  because	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  did	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  another.	  	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  English	  got	  in	  to	  their	  debt	  at	  “too	  dear	  a	  rate,	  making	  good	  the	  Old	  Proverb,”	  and	  that	  they	  simply	  cannot	  offset	  the	  change	  in	  silver	  by	  selling	  commodities.95	  	  The	  expatriate	  believed	  “the	  Dutch	  are	  wiser,”	  and	  that	  “[the	  government]	  [has]	  almost	  cut	  the	  English	  Merchant,	  and	  English	  Shipping	  out	  of	  all	  trade.”96	  	  Clearly	  his	  dire	  predictions	  about	  the	  future	  of	  English	  commerce	  and	  shipping	  were	  incorrect,	  however,	  he	  did	  accurately	  predict	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  London	  Exchange	  in	  trade.	  	  The	  Merchant	  also	  conceded	  that	  “	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  you	  can	  carry	  on	  the	  war	  unless”	  the	  changes	  were	  made	  to	  the	  currency,	  and	  circulated	  the	  contemporary	  rumor	  that	  “one	  third	  of	  [the	  light	  money]	  is	  Iron.”97	  	  He	  emphasized	  that	  “you	  [will]	  lose	  so	  much	  of	  your	  rents,	  debts,	  and	  value	  of	  your	  lands”	  if	  the	  currency	  were	  changed.98	  	  
The	  arguments	  the	  English	  Merchant	  in	  Amsterdam	  advances	  are	  representative	  of	  conservative	  thought	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  of	  the	  resistance	  to	  William.	  	  A	  foreign	  merchant	  stood	  to	  lose	  more	  than	  nearly	  any	  other	  group	  with	  the	  changing	  of	  the	  English	  silver	  and	  gold	  money,	  dependent	  on	  trade,	  as	  he	  benefitted	  directly	  from	  the	  imbalance	  in	  exchange	  rates.	  	  Much	  of	  what	  he	  said	  in	  his	  pamphlet	  seems	  to	  a	  reflection	  of	  what	  was	  likely	  being	  said	  by	  the	  contemporary	  merchant	  class.	  	  As	  a	  fellow	  English	  man,	  this	  merchant	  in	  Amsterdam	  had	  a	  special	  ability	  to	  sway	  opinion	  among	  his	  countrymen	  due	  to	  his	  exposure	  to	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  William’s	  policies	  there.	  	  His	  pamphlet	  was	  evidently	  influential	  as	  both	  Henry	  Layton	  and	  John	  Locke	  responded	  directly	  to	  it	  in	  their	  own	  pamphlets	  that	  circulated	  among	  the	  members	  of	  Parliament	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  	  
The	  next	  contemporary	  polemic	  on	  the	  Currency	  Crisis,	  Henry	  Layton	  refuted	  the	  merchant	  in	  his	  “Observations	  Concerning	  Money	  and	  Coin,”	  an	  extensive	  treatise	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  defending	  the	  proposed	  new	  system	  of	  money.	  	  He	  spends	  almost	  the	  entire	  pamphlet	  directly	  refuting	  the	  letter	  written	  by	  the	  “English	  Merchant	  in	  Amsterdam.”	  	  The	  preface	  stated	  that	  a	  friend	  lent	  him	  “the	  Merchant	  of	  Amsterdam’s	  Letter,	  also	  Mr.	  Locke’s	  Book	  and	  his	  two	  letters	  about	  gold	  and	  silver”	  which	  motivated	  him	  to	  write	  his	  “Observations.”99	  	  He	  hoped	  that	  his	  pamphlet	  would	  be	  published	  and	  circulated	  early	  enough	  and	  before	  the	  next	  sitting	  of	  Parliament	  in	  1697,	  so	  as	  to	  influence	  its	  members	  to	  support	  the	  new	  monetary	  system.100	  	  
An	  advocate	  for	  William’s	  changes	  to	  the	  monetary	  system,	  Layton	  began	  by	  giving	  an	  extensive	  history	  of	  the	  monetary	  systems	  of	  the	  British	  Isles.	  He	  described	  the	  Roman	  coins	  of	  silver	  and	  gold,	  then	  proceeds	  to	  the	  silver	  coins	  of	  varying	  weights	  from	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  kings,	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  more	  contemporary	  changes	  to	  weights	  and	  make-­‐ups	  of	  the	  silver	  currency.101	  	  From	  his	  history	  of	  coins,	  he	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  contemporary	  hysteria	  over	  the	  “lightening”	  of	  the	  coins	  –	  changing	  their	  alloy	  and	  reducing	  their	  silver	  content	  –	  was	  unfounded	  due	  to	  numerous	  occasions	  of	  such	  lightening	  over	  the	  years.	  He	  then	  stated	  that	  he	  aims	  to	  directly	  counter	  the	  pamphlet	  of	  “The	  Amsterdam	  Merchant.”	  	  He	  asserted	  that	  England	  is	  being	  made	  poorer	  because	  their	  money	  is	  too	  intrinsically	  valuable	  –	  based	  on	  the	  precious	  metal	  content	  in	  them	  -­‐	  and	  is	  being	  carried	  out	  of	  the	  country	  by	  foreigners.102	  	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  English	  merchants	  would	  benefit	  from	  increased	  monetary	  circulation,	  which	  would	  end	  the	  chronic	  shortages	  of	  the	  lifeblood	  of	  commerce.	  	  Too,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  currency	  is	  of	  little	  importance	  to	  most	  Englishmen	  day-­‐to-­‐day.	  	  Reduced	  value,	  he	  claimed,	  will	  “appear	  only	  in	  our	  trade	  with	  other	  nations.”103	  	  According	  to	  Layton,	  England	  experienced	  an	  incredible	  scarcity	  of	  specie	  because	  of	  foreigners	  exporting	  it	  for	  their	  profits	  and	  because	  of	  English	  debts	  to	  other	  nations.	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  Interestingly,	  his	  views	  on	  reducing	  the	  worth	  of	  the	  coin	  as	  a	  way	  to	  pay	  off	  debt	  more	  easily	  is	  akin	  to	  a	  modern	  day	  currency	  devaluation.	  	  	  
Layton	  also	  wrote	  about	  the	  need	  to	  abolish	  “clip’t	  money”	  or	  coins	  that	  have	  been	  cut	  down	  in	  pieces	  or	  damaged,	  because,	  with	  the	  value	  no	  longer	  tied	  to	  weight,	  clipping	  of	  money	  would	  be	  unnecessary.104	  	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  “Letter	  from	  an	  Amsterdam	  Merchant,”	  he	  claimed	  that	  other	  nations	  would	  not	  stop	  trading	  with	  Britain	  because	  of	  the	  change	  in	  currency.	  Most	  pertinent	  from	  a	  historical	  perspective,	  he	  stated	  “though	  they	  know	  it	  to	  be	  of	  the	  [reduced	  weight],	  and	  this	  proves	  the	  Stamp	  of	  Authority	  upon	  Money	  at	  home,	  more	  valuable	  than	  the	  weight	  or	  quantity	  of	  it.”105	  	  This	  argument	  evidences	  a	  change	  to	  a	  more	  modern	  perspective;	  he	  sees	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  state	  behind	  currency	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  coin’s	  value	  opposed	  to	  a	  coin’s	  weight	  in	  silver.	  	  This	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  behind	  the	  currency	  is	  enormously	  important:	  William	  in	  effect	  recreated	  the	  state	  and	  so	  recreating	  the	  money	  in	  the	  image	  of	  his	  new	  kingdom	  made	  financial	  and	  symbolic	  sense.	  	  England	  was	  to	  longer	  be	  ruled	  by	  Catholic	  monarchs	  with	  pretensions	  of	  being	  like	  their	  “Sun	  King”	  cousin	  in	  France,	  but	  rather	  a	  nation	  based	  on	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  public	  good	  with	  a	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  and	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  governed.	  	  The	  king	  and	  his	  people	  were	  no	  longer	  to	  be	  separate	  –	  akin	  to	  the	  debt	  becoming	  “nationalized”	  –	  and	  the	  currency	  was	  to	  represent	  the	  nation,	  not	  just	  the	  metal	  in	  the	  coins.	  	  	  
Adding	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “stockjobber,”	  Simon	  Clement	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  contemporary	  monetary	  debate	  in	  “A	  Discourse	  of	  the	  General	  Notions	  of	  Money,	  Trade	  &	  Exchanges.”	  	  His	  purpose	  was	  to	  “[write]…	  in	  hopes	  that	  [he]	  might	  have	  been	  of	  service”	  to	  that	  session	  of	  Parliament;	  his	  pamphlet	  was	  published	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  session.106	  	  First,	  he	  believed	  “encouragement	  may	  be	  given	  for	  people	  to	  bring	  in	  their	  silver	  to	  the	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  mint”	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  ineffective	  to	  attempt	  to	  “prevent	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  our	  bullion	  or	  exporting	  of	  our	  coin.”	  	  These	  were	  both	  important	  policy	  considerations	  at	  the	  time	  in	  Parliament,	  and	  he	  pointed	  out	  the	  inefficacy	  of	  stopping	  bullion	  export.	  	  Instead,	  Clement	  advocated	  a	  full	  re-­‐issuance	  of	  the	  currency	  with	  coins	  “one	  quarter	  part	  less	  in	  weight.”	  Noting	  the	  role	  of	  government	  to	  determine	  economic	  policy,	  he	  wrote	  “distinct	  governments	  made	  the	  allay	  of	  their	  metals	  finer	  or	  courser	  and	  gave	  their	  coins	  such	  denominations	  and	  as	  many	  different	  species	  as	  they	  thought	  necessary	  to	  themselves	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  different	  usage	  of	  their	  neighbors.”	  	  With	  this	  statement,	  he	  indirectly	  addressed	  those	  who	  asserted	  that	  William	  could	  not	  or	  should	  not	  alter	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  coinage	  away	  from	  its	  current	  weight	  and	  makeup.	  	  	  
His	  proposal	  to	  solve	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  contained	  many	  elements	  that	  were	  eventually	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  government	  –	  most	  notably	  his	  proposal	  to	  take	  in	  and	  recoin	  all	  the	  nation’s	  clipped	  money.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  should	  “receive	  in	  all	  the	  Good	  Clipt	  Money…	  enter	  the	  sum	  and	  weight	  of	  every	  man’s	  parcel	  in	  a	  book	  and	  seal	  up	  the	  same	  in	  bags	  giving	  them	  as	  many	  certificate	  as	  they	  please	  in	  parchment	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  sum	  they	  brought	  in.”	  	  Arguing	  in	  favor	  of	  paper	  currency,	  “These	  certificates…	  should	  be	  delivered	  from	  man	  to	  man	  in	  payments,”	  and	  “people	  of	  business	  [are]….	  content	  to	  take	  the	  endorsed	  certificates.”	  107	  	  A	  radical	  solution	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  elements	  of	  this	  were	  actually	  taken	  up	  only	  two	  years	  later	  by	  King	  William	  III.	  	  In	  Clement’s	  view,	  one	  of	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis	  was	  to	  prevent	  counterfeiting	  and	  clipping	  of	  the	  currency.	  	  Additionally,	  reflecting	  his	  firsthand	  experience	  in	  the	  London	  Exchange,	  he	  encouraged	  “[preventing]	  exchangers	  from	  taking	  advantage”	  of	  the	  markets	  with	  “regulation	  upon	  the	  price	  of	  bullion	  and	  exchanges.”	  	  He	  closed	  by	  noting	  the	  difficulty	  and	  unpopularity	  of	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  42	  some	  of	  these	  measures	  but	  predicts	  they	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  fight	  war	  if	  they	  do	  not	  change	  and	  take	  charge	  of	  the	  silver	  market.108	  	  Clement’s	  suggestions	  were,	  in	  large	  part,	  adopted.	  The	  government	  did	  eventually	  re-­‐coin	  the	  money,	  take	  in	  clipped	  money,	  restrict	  the	  purchase	  of	  certain	  imported	  goods,	  and	  begin	  moving	  to	  more	  paper	  currency	  to	  reduce	  dependence	  on	  silver.	  	  	  
Also	  weighing	  in	  on	  the	  currency	  debate,	  the	  merchant	  A.	  Vickaris	  in	  “An	  Essay	  for	  Regulating	  of	  the	  Coyn”	  was	  notable	  for	  his	  advocacy	  of	  making	  the	  currency	  from	  a	  cheaper	  alloy,	  which	  was	  part	  of	  the	  ultimate	  solution.	  	  The	  merchant	  addressed	  his	  essay	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  government,	  including	  members	  of	  the	  King’s	  Privy	  Council	  and	  the	  Exchequer,	  and	  Parliament	  hoping	  to	  sway	  them	  in	  favor	  of	  currency	  regulation.	  	  He	  began	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  previous	  fifteen	  years	  of	  war	  with	  Spain	  and	  France	  “hath	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  the	  regular	  proceedings	  of	  the	  fleets”	  that	  delivered	  gold	  and	  silver	  to	  Britain.109	  	  Rather	  than	  accusing	  speculators	  or	  bullion	  exports,	  he	  cited	  the	  war	  with	  Spain	  and	  decline	  of	  imports	  from	  the	  New	  World	  to	  help	  explain	  why	  there	  was	  such	  an	  acute	  shortage	  of	  hard	  currency	  in	  this	  period.	  	  He	  asserted	  that	  in	  order	  to	  decrease	  their	  trade	  deficit	  they	  should	  impose	  import	  duties	  to	  discourage	  the	  purchase	  of	  goods	  like	  Spanish	  wine	  or	  Portuguese	  oil.	  	  A	  taste	  for	  foreign	  goods	  has	  “lost	  [at]	  the	  expense	  of	  our	  own	  product	  and	  manufactory”	  and	  the	  government	  should	  “obstruct	  the	  importation	  of	  so	  much	  as	  they	  import.”110	  	  His	  protectionist	  stance	  is	  surprising	  from	  the	  British	  merchant	  class	  who	  is	  historically	  thought	  of	  as	  favoring	  free	  trade.	  	  Then	  echoing	  what	  many	  of	  his	  contemporaries	  wrote	  Vickaris	  claimed,	  “our	  coyned	  money	  hath	  proceeded	  from	  the	  suffering	  bullion	  to	  be	  shipped	  off,	  [because]	  the	  price	  of	  it	  doth	  exceed	  the	  value	  of	  our	  coyned	  silver	  and	  gold.”111	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  43	  William’s	  addressing	  the	  pressing	  Currency	  Crisis	  brought	  a	  variety	  of	  proposals	  in	  response.	  	  Vicaris’	  suggestions	  resembled	  the	  ultimate	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  government.	  	  Like	  Clement,	  he	  advocated	  collecting	  all	  the	  clipped	  coins	  “and	  re-­‐coyning	  [them]	  into	  pieces	  of	  the	  same	  denomination,	  but	  of	  less	  value	  in	  substance,”	  or	  in	  other	  words	  create	  a	  less-­‐valuable	  alloyed	  coin.112	  	  Clement	  also	  claimed	  the	  shortages	  of	  specie	  warrant	  melting	  down	  the	  “seven	  millions	  of	  pounds	  sterling	  in	  household	  plate…	  gold	  rings,	  buttons,	  buckles,	  watches,	  sword-­‐hilts,	  etc.”	  	  and	  all	  of	  the	  clipped	  money	  throughout	  the	  country.	  Recognizing	  the	  difficulty	  in	  collecting	  the	  silver	  plates	  throughout	  the	  country,	  Vickaris	  suggested	  “[going]	  to	  the	  house	  of	  any	  person	  where	  they	  are	  advised	  to	  be	  above	  fifty	  pounds	  value	  of	  plate	  to	  be	  stamped.”113	  	  This	  radical	  proposal	  should	  signal	  to	  the	  modern	  reader	  how	  dire	  the	  shortage	  of	  currency	  was	  to	  1690s	  England	  when	  a	  merchant	  polemicist	  advocates	  melting	  down	  candlesticks	  and	  belt	  buckles.	  	  His	  most	  significant	  proposal	  was	  to	  make	  the	  new	  money	  a	  cheaper	  alloy	  because	  it	  “makes	  up	  the	  weight	  taken	  [out]”	  in	  silver	  and	  gold,	  while	  does	  not	  “make	  any	  great	  difference	  in	  the	  colour,	  sound	  or	  weight”	  of	  the	  money.	  Having	  conducted	  research	  on	  the	  weight	  of	  coins	  nationwide	  he	  calculated	  that	  “what	  money	  is	  new	  coyned,	  must	  be	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  twelve	  and	  a	  half	  per	  cent	  less	  weight	  [in	  gold	  or	  silver]	  each	  species	  than	  before	  it	  was	  coyned	  for.”114	  	  Further,	  he	  laid	  out	  the	  need	  for	  a	  cheaper	  alloy,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  each	  metal	  to	  make	  the	  coins	  the	  same	  weight	  with	  less	  silver	  or	  gold	  content.	  Attempting	  to	  calculate	  the	  commercial	  benefits	  of	  a	  recoining,	  Vickaris	  estimated	  the	  recoining	  would	  bring	  a	  “five	  hundred	  thousand	  pound	  a	  year	  advantage	  to	  the	  nation.”115	  His	  work	  is	  most	  important	  because	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  coins	  that	  William	  eventually	  issued	  were	  similar	  to	  those	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  advocated	  by	  Vickaris.	  	  His	  extensive	  research	  also	  could	  have	  appealed	  to	  the	  data-­‐lovers	  of	  the	  day	  during	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  debate.	  Altogether,	  the	  scholars’	  and	  polemicists’	  ideas	  form	  a	  compelling	  collection	  of	  proclamations	  directed	  to	  moving	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policy	  forward.	  	  Aspects	  of	  each	  author’s	  arguments	  found	  their	  way	  into	  policies	  advocated	  and	  ultimately	  adopted	  by	  the	  government.	  	  From	  Locke	  and	  Layton,	  the	  stamp	  of	  the	  government	  conferring	  the	  coin’s	  true	  value;	  from	  Clement	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  national	  recoinage	  of	  all	  of	  the	  nation’s	  money	  supply;	  and	  from	  Vickaris	  a	  cheaper	  alloy	  to	  make	  the	  coins	  less	  valuable.	  	  Taken	  together	  –	  	  along	  with	  increased	  use	  of	  paper	  money,	  which	  various	  authors	  also	  mentioned	  –-­‐	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  began	  to	  be	  resolved.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  authors	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  shaping	  the	  contentious	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  issues	  at	  the	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  offering	  solutions	  to	  the	  nation	  for	  the	  crisis	  plaguing	  them.	  	  Without	  resolution	  of	  the	  Currency	  Crisis,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  England’s	  economy	  to	  modernize	  or	  for	  William’s	  Financial	  Revolution	  to	  take	  place	  at	  all.	  	  
Part	  II.B.iii:	   William’s	  Resolution	  of	  the	  Crisis	  William	  resolved	  the	  crisis	  through	  a	  serious	  of	  royal	  proclamations	  and	  actions	  that	  were	  inspired	  by	  both	  his	  time	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  merchant	  interests	  that	  brought	  him	  to	  power.	  	  His	  reliance	  on	  proclamations	  to	  achieve	  his	  agenda	  reflected	  the	  contentious	  nature	  of	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  and	  the	  stiff	  resistance	  he	  encountered	  in	  Parliament.	  	  Committed	  to	  his	  agenda,	  he	  resolved	  the	  crisis	  through	  a	  series	  of	  royal	  proclamations	  in	  the	  late	  1690s.	  	  He	  recognized	  that	  he	  could	  not	  wait	  for	  action	  or	  consensus	  from	  Parliament:	  Doing	  so	  would	  continue	  to	  stymie	  commercial	  activity	  in	  the	  British	  Isles.	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  The	  first	  of	  his	  proclamations	  relating	  to	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  dates	  from	  4	  January	  1696.	  	  In	  it,	  he	  declared	  “no	  clipped	  crowns	  or	  half	  crowns,	  nor	  shillings,	  or	  other	  money,	  clipped	  within	  the	  Ring,	  should	  pass	  or	  be	  currency	  in	  any	  payments,	  except	  only	  to	  the	  receivers	  or	  collector	  of	  our	  revenues	  and	  taxes.”116	  	  The	  expected	  result	  of	  the	  proclamation	  was	  that	  by	  requiring	  that	  having	  clipped	  money	  no	  longer	  be	  used	  for	  anything	  but	  paying	  taxes,	  it	  would	  remove	  them	  from	  circulation	  most	  effectively.	  	  Thus,	  he	  could	  start	  the	  process	  of	  taking	  in	  clipped	  coins	  for	  reissuance	  –	  without	  alarming	  confiscation	  –	  and	  ending	  their	  use	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  transactions.	  	  He	  then	  listed	  a	  timetable	  for	  how	  long	  people	  could	  use	  the	  clipped	  money,	  lasting	  “unto	  the	  Second	  day	  of	  April	  next	  inclusive”	  and	  instructed	  his	  collectors	  to	  “tender	  the	  same	  to	  them	  for	  any	  of	  our	  Taxes	  of	  Revenues.”	  117	  	  This	  first	  proclamation	  was	  an	  enormous	  step	  towards	  starting	  to	  address	  the	  problem;	  William	  had	  been	  brought	  in	  by	  merchants	  for	  action	  on	  the	  economy,	  and	  action	  he	  quickly	  delivered.	  	  While	  the	  Stuart	  kings	  were	  willing	  to	  tolerate	  the	  issues	  a	  commerce-­‐focused	  king	  like	  William	  took	  action.	  	  	  
Only	  four	  months	  later,	  William	  issued	  another	  proclamation	  aimed	  at	  the	  Currency	  Crisis.	  	  In	  it,	  he	  levied	  an	  additional	  four	  shilling	  per	  person	  tax	  to	  fight	  France.	  	  His	  proclamation	  encouraged	  people	  to	  use	  their	  clipped	  money	  to	  pay	  the	  additional	  levy.	  He	  instructed	  his	  collectors	  to	  “tender	  the	  same	  such	  clipped	  money	  as	  aforesaid,”	  and	  allowed	  the	  use	  of	  the	  clipped	  money	  “at	  any	  time	  before	  the	  said	  fourth	  day	  of	  May	  next.”118	  	  The	  king	  reiterated	  his	  goal	  of	  recoining	  the	  nation’s	  money	  and	  eliminating	  the	  clipped	  money;	  his	  collectors	  will	  “use	  the	  utmost	  speed	  and	  diligence	  in	  the	  raising,	  collecting,	  and	  paying	  all	  such	  clipped	  moneys	  into	  our	  exchequer.”119	  	  His	  proclamation	  threatened	  punishment	  for	  those	  who	  did	  not	  stop	  using	  clipped	  money	  or	  who	  did	  not	  pay	  the	  tax	  to	  fund	  the	  war	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  against	  France.	  	  The	  proclamation	  is	  notable	  for	  not	  simply	  how	  quickly	  it	  followed	  the	  previous	  one,	  but	  also	  for	  its	  multiple	  purposes.	  	  It	  provided	  revenue	  to	  wage	  war	  against	  France,	  it	  took	  clipped	  coins	  out	  of	  circulation,	  and	  supplied	  the	  Mint	  with	  gold	  and	  silver	  to	  mint	  the	  new	  recoined	  currency.	  	  This	  need	  for	  money	  to	  fight	  France	  helps	  demonstrate	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  the	  recoinage:	  	  even	  though	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  had	  been	  established,	  it	  was	  still	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems	  the	  lack	  of	  currency	  posed	  for	  Britain.	  	  	  
After	  inaugurating	  the	  crucial	  elements	  of	  his	  Financial	  Revolution,	  William	  highlighted	  the	  important	  economic	  and	  monetary	  changes	  he	  had	  instituted	  in	  a	  July	  of	  1698	  in	  a	  speech	  to	  Parliament.	  	  Of	  all	  the	  reforms	  he	  and	  Parliament	  had	  accomplished,	  whether	  with	  them	  or	  through	  proclamations,	  he	  mentioned	  the	  reforms	  to	  the	  currency	  before	  any	  others.	  	  This	  reflects	  their	  primacy	  in	  the	  Financial	  Revolution;	  without	  them	  nothing	  else	  could	  have	  been	  accomplished.	  	  His	  speech	  thanked	  Parliament	  for	  quickly	  “the	  remedying	  of	  the	  corruption	  of	  the	  coin”	  and	  “the	  restoring	  of	  credit”	  to	  the	  nation.120	  	  He	  then	  commended	  their	  efforts	  “towards	  satisfying	  the	  debts	  in	  so	  long	  a	  war	  with	  as	  little	  burden	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  as	  is	  possible.”	  He	  also	  praised	  Parliament	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  “The	  establishment	  of	  [his]	  revenue,”	  or	  the	  national	  debt,	  because	  it	  allowed	  a	  lower	  tax	  burden	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  people	  of	  England.	  	  While	  he	  mentioned	  a	  few	  other	  parliamentary	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  previous	  years,	  his	  greatest	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  monetary	  changes.	  121	  	  	  His	  speech	  did	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  significant	  divisions	  within	  the	  Parliament	  or	  the	  political	  resistance	  they	  put	  up	  against	  his	  ideas	  and	  policies.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  king	  did	  not	  feel	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  address	  this,	  or	  perhaps	  he	  felt	  so	  strongly	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  about	  his	  reforms	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  opponents.	  	  Either	  way,	  he	  clearly	  considered	  his	  financial	  reforms	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  his	  reign	  as	  king.	  	  	  
Indeed,	  of	  all	  the	  elements	  of	  William’s	  financial	  revolution,	  his	  resolution	  of	  the	  Currency	  Crisis	  was	  doubtless	  the	  most	  significant.	  	  Had	  he	  not	  been	  able	  to	  institute	  changes	  to	  inject	  currency	  into	  the	  market,	  the	  economy	  would	  have	  continued	  to	  stagnate,	  and	  his	  other	  measures,	  such	  as,	  his	  changes	  to	  the	  national	  debt	  and	  banking,	  would	  have	  had	  little	  impact	  or	  been	  for	  naught.	  	  Longer-­‐term,	  England’s	  movement	  to	  a	  currency	  based	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  nation	  behind	  it	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  Britain’s	  later	  commercial	  dominance	  and	  leadership	  in	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution.	  	  
Combined	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  of	  the	  national	  debt,	  along	  with	  government	  advocacy	  for	  the	  merchant	  class,	  a	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  began	  to	  emerge.	  	  This	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  combined	  both	  a	  world-­‐class	  armed	  forces	  and	  an	  enormous	  financial	  sector,	  backed	  by	  government-­‐subsidized	  debt,	  which	  allowed	  Britain	  to	  grow	  an	  enormous	  empire.	  	  None	  of	  this	  future	  growth,	  however	  tantalizing	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  William’s	  ascension	  to	  the	  throne	  or	  resolution	  of	  the	  Currency	  Crisis.	  
Part	  III:	  Effects	  of	  William’s	  Revolution	  
Part	  III.A:	   Culture	  of	  Commerce	  A	  true	  “culture	  of	  commerce”	  began	  to	  develop	  in	  this	  period,	  as	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  a	  number	  of	  historians	  such	  as	  Glaisyer,	  Houston	  and	  Pincus,	  and	  Ormrod.122	  	  This	  shift	  in	  the	  culture,	  however,	  can	  also	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  in	  Britain	  of	  this	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  time.	  	  The	  New	  London	  Merchants	  and	  the	  Immortal	  Seven	  brought	  a	  king	  to	  the	  throne	  who	  would	  put	  their	  concerns	  first	  and	  who	  would	  institute	  enormous	  financial	  reforms.	  	  His	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  changes	  created	  a	  vast	  expansion	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  Britain	  as	  this	  paper	  has	  chronicled.	  	  This	  financial	  sector	  began	  to	  take	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  nation.	  In	  its	  culture,	  William’s	  era	  reflected	  the	  constituency	  that	  brought	  him	  to	  power,	  and,	  thus,	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  Culture	  of	  Commerce.	  	  	  
Merchants	  brought	  about	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  and	  King	  William	  III	  advanced	  their	  interests	  while	  in	  power.	  	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  having	  an	  advocate	  in	  power,	  English	  culture	  shifted	  to	  one	  that	  aimed	  to	  glorify	  the	  merchant.	  	  For	  example,	  The	  London	  Exchange	  in	  the	  1690s	  became	  the	  center	  of	  London’s	  commercial	  life	  and	  culture.123	  	  Glaisyer	  writes	  about	  the	  London	  Exchange,	  which	  was	  rebuilt	  gloriously	  after	  the	  London	  fire	  in	  1666	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  city.124	  	  Its	  grandeur	  symbolized	  a	  return	  to	  glory	  for	  the	  Exchange	  but	  also	  for	  the	  priorities	  and	  values	  of	  the	  government	  and	  merchants	  at	  the	  time.	  	  The	  building	  even	  included	  sculpture	  niches	  along	  its	  exterior	  filled	  with	  Greco-­‐Roman	  style	  sculptures	  of	  modern	  merchants.	  	  Commerce	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  profession	  whose	  morality	  was	  subject	  to	  debate;	  it	  was	  a	  top	  priority	  of	  the	  king	  and	  to	  be	  celebrated	  by	  the	  nation.	  	  Stopping	  by	  the	  Exchange	  –	  which	  was	  both	  a	  market	  and	  sort	  of	  proto-­‐stock	  exchange	  –	  was	  the	  main	  part	  of	  a	  merchant’s	  routine	  in	  the	  late	  1690s.	  As	  time	  progressed	  and	  the	  City	  of	  London	  began	  to	  overtake	  Amsterdam	  as	  the	  center	  of	  finance,	  the	  London	  Exchange	  became	  the	  center	  of	  global	  trade	  as	  well.	  	  A	  writer	  at	  the	  time	  wrote,	  “[t]his	  is	  the	  Centre	  of	  Commerce	  for	  here	  nations	  from	  the	  circumference	  [of	  the	  world]	  appear;	  here	  we	  see,	  point	  and	  meet	  the	  worlds	  extream’s.”	  Reflecting	  this	  cosmopolitan	  perspective,	  the	  rebuilt	  Exchange	  had	  separate	  areas	  of	  the	  building	  for	  areas	  as	  diverse	  as	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  the	  Baltic,	  the	  East	  Indies,	  and	  Turkey.125	  	  Without	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  monetary	  and	  financial	  sectors	  the	  Exchange	  would	  not	  have	  been	  as	  cosmopolitan	  or	  busy.	  	  
William’s	  revolution	  and	  commercial	  developments	  also	  fostered	  other	  noteworthy	  social	  changes.	  	  Accompanying	  this	  rise	  in	  trade	  in	  the	  Exchange	  and	  of	  finance	  in	  The	  City	  of	  London,	  specialized	  business	  newspapers	  like	  The	  Collection	  by	  Houghton	  and	  British	  
Mercury	  began	  to	  be	  published	  regularly.	  	  They	  reported	  foreign	  exchange	  prices,	  stock	  prices,	  commodity	  prices,	  shipping	  news,	  and	  foreign	  news.126	  	  In	  addition,	  records	  from	  the	  British	  East	  India	  and	  Levant	  Companies	  show	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  attention	  paid	  to	  merchants.	  	  Remaining	  copies	  of	  written	  sermons	  from	  that	  time	  show	  merchants	  increasingly	  being	  included	  in	  parables	  or	  serving	  as	  examples	  of	  morality.	  	  Sermons	  “honoured	  [merchant]	  as	  heroes	  in	  accounts	  of	  trade,	  and	  lent	  their	  glory…	  to	  London,	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  monarch.”127	  	  Also	  reflecting	  the	  glorification	  of	  the	  merchant,	  the	  motto	  of	  the	  city	  of	  London,	  based	  on	  the	  1706	  almanac	  and	  calendar	  published	  by	  the	  City,	  was	  “Our	  Loyalty	  is	  the	  High-­‐Road.	  	  To	  a	  full	  Trade,	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.”	  This	  motto	  was	  accompanied	  with	  an	  engraving	  of	  the	  Exchange	  building	  as	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London.128	  	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  new	  “spiritual”	  center	  of	  the	  city	  was	  not	  a	  church	  or	  government	  building,	  but	  rather	  the	  commercial	  exchange	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  business	  and	  trade	  it	  epitomized.	  	  These	  individuals	  were	  no	  longer	  seen	  merely	  as	  profit-­‐seekers	  or	  leeches	  on	  society,	  but	  rather	  as	  respectable	  class	  of	  people	  who	  were	  to	  be	  promoted	  by	  the	  government	  and	  praised	  by	  the	  clergy.	  	  Merchants	  who	  had	  installed	  a	  king	  friendly	  to	  their	  interests,	  not	  only	  reaped	  economic	  benefits,	  but	  also	  those	  of	  increased	  prestige.	  	  	  
The	  emergence	  of	  this	  culture	  of	  commerce	  reflects	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  new	  reign.	  	  It	  is	  fitting	  that	  a	  king	  brought	  to	  power,	  to	  a	  significant	  degree,	  by	  economic	  concerns	  and	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  with	  the	  support	  of	  a	  group	  called	  the	  New	  London	  Merchants	  would	  preside	  over	  an	  era	  that	  celebrated	  merchants.	  	  This	  cultural	  shift	  –	  to	  a	  “Culture	  of	  Commerce”	  –	  is	  emblematic	  of	  both	  William’s	  kingship	  and	  a	  larger	  shift	  in	  governance	  to	  one	  that	  celebrated	  commerce	  and	  merchant-­‐traders.	  Just	  as	  Locke’s	  theory	  of	  government	  proclaimed	  that	  the	  government	  existed	  to	  protect	  property,	  so	  too	  merchants	  of	  this	  era	  too	  desired	  that	  the	  government	  protect	  their	  property	  from	  foreign	  invasion	  and	  advocate	  their	  interests.	  	  	  
Part	  III.B:	  	   Revolution	  in	  Political	  Economy	  Although	  history	  has	  traditionally	  focused	  on	  the	  political	  and	  religious	  implications	  and	  motivations	  of	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  the	  financial	  changes	  William	  and	  Mary	  brought	  with	  them	  from	  the	  Netherlands	  were	  truly	  revolutionary.	  As	  D.W.	  Jones	  has	  argued:	  “[t]he	  primary	  consequence	  of	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	  on	  economic	  and	  commercial	  life	  has	  generally	  been	  identified	  as	  …	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  ‘fiscal-­‐military	  state,’	  underpinned	  by	  new	  financial	  techniques	  and	  institutions.”129	  	  Although	  many	  of	  the	  most	  important	  changes	  associated	  with	  the	  Financial	  Revolution	  occurred	  during	  the	  1690s,	  the	  impetus	  for	  these	  changes	  began	  earlier,	  as	  we	  have	  seen.	  	  The	  Immortal	  Seven	  and	  the	  New	  London	  Merchants’	  actions	  led	  to	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  and	  William	  and	  Mary’s	  enormous	  fiscal	  changes.	  	  In	  large	  part,	  economic	  interests	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  North	  Sea	  are	  what	  truly	  brought	  about	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution.	  	  William	  represented,	  in	  both	  political	  and	  economic	  terms,	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  a	  new	  social	  compact;	  much	  like	  that	  Locke	  defined	  in	  his	  Two	  Treatises.	  	  The	  closer	  correspondence	  between	  William’s	  actions	  and	  Locke’s	  philosophy	  made	  the	  latter	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  age.	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  The	  actions	  taken	  during	  this	  period	  were	  revolutionary	  in	  setting	  up	  Britain	  for	  future	  economic	  success.	  	  By	  1713,	  Britain	  had	  fought	  twenty	  years	  of	  wars	  against	  Louis	  XIV,	  and	  built	  a	  substantial	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  that	  had	  overtaken	  Amsterdam	  as	  the	  center	  of	  European	  finance	  and	  commerce	  –-­‐	  all	  made	  possible	  largely	  by	  William’s	  financial	  innovations.	  	  Britain’s	  enhanced	  military	  capability	  no	  longer	  served	  merely	  defensive	  purposes	  but	  now	  would	  be	  used	  to	  support	  strategic	  foreign	  and	  imperial	  policies	  designed	  to	  weaken	  rival	  commercial	  empires.130	  	  Central	  to	  this	  fiscal-­‐military	  state	  was	  the	  foundation	  of	  “public	  credit”	  or	  a	  national	  debt,	  which	  served	  as	  both	  a	  safe	  haven	  investment	  for	  consumers	  and	  an	  instrument	  of	  increased	  government	  spending.	  	  Also	  critical	  in	  this	  era	  was	  the	  development	  of	  a	  more	  mature	  financial	  sector	  from	  the	  humble	  goldsmith-­‐bankers.	  Public	  credit	  provided	  for	  government	  spending	  to	  increase	  threefold	  in	  the	  decade	  and	  a	  half	  of	  William	  III’s	  reign	  to	  fight	  wars	  abroad,	  and	  the	  steady	  interest	  that	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  bonds	  provided	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  financial	  sector.	  	  This	  financial	  sector	  was	  not	  only	  important	  economically,	  but	  also	  socially	  because	  they	  saw	  themselves	  a	  distinct	  socioeconomic	  group.	  	  
None	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  this	  period	  can	  individually	  be	  considered	  revolutionary	  or	  particularly	  radical.	  	  For	  example,	  lightening	  in	  the	  currency	  had	  occurred	  previously	  as	  Layton	  pointed	  out	  in	  his	  pamphlet.	  	  However,	  the	  cumulative	  effects	  on	  Britain	  were	  dramatic.	  	  Without	  the	  stabilization	  of	  the	  money	  market,	  creation	  a	  public	  debt	  and	  national	  bank,	  and	  growth	  of	  a	  financial	  sector	  Britain,	  certainly	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  nation	  would	  have	  achieved	  as	  much	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  certainly	  not	  as	  swiftly	  or	  dramatically.	  	  Had	  Britain	  not	  possessed	  the	  means	  to	  fight	  wars	  against	  France	  without	  significant	  tax	  burdens	  or	  without	  a	  strong	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